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ABSTRACT 
 
The present study aims at investigating the determinants of shareholder 
activism in emerging markets based on Institutional Theory, Resource-Based 
View and Austrian economics. 
This dissertation, which is part of the researcher‟s doctoral project, reviews the 
literature on the topic and describes the methodological approach that will be 
adopted in the PhD research. 
This topic was chosen because the literature demonstrates that there is a gap in 
research on shareholder activism in emerging markets, besides a lack of a 
systematic analysis of the institutions that influence activism. In addition, no 
study was found that adopts Resource-Based View or Austrian economics to 
explain the use of shareholder activism as a source of active entrepreneurial 
choice. 
Drawing on the literature, the researcher developed a set of hypotheses 
concerning the factors that promote or inhibit shareholder activism. These will 
be tested through quantitative and qualitative methods. Firstly, statistical 
analysis will be employed to test the relationship between institutional 
influences and shareholder activism in the emerging market countries. 
Secondly, through case study research, a number of institutional investors will 
be interviewed so as to examine to what extent shareholder activism is 
motivated by strategic decision making. 
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This research will have both academic and practical benefits. Academically, this 
research will develop the literature regarding shareholder activism in emerging 
markets. It will also benefit institutionalists, RVB academics and Austrian 
economists as these theories prove to be effective in explaining shareholder 
activism. Practically, it will help investors to design global shareholder activism 
strategies by identifying the factors that enhance or curb activism in emerging 
markets. 
 
Key words: Shareholder Engagement, Shareholder Activism, Active Share 
Ownership, Corporate Social Responsibility, Institutional Theory, Austrian 
Economics, Corporate Governance, Resource-Based View.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study aims at analysing the factors that influence shareholder activism in 
emerging markets. Shareholder activism, also known as shareholder 
engagement or active share ownership, occurs when “shareholders make use 
of their rights in order to monitor, and sometimes influence, how the companies 
they invest in manage ESG issues” (Eurosif 2006, p. 9). 
This particular topic area was selected because the researcher found a gap in 
the literature on shareholder activism in emerging markets (Sjostrom 2008), 
besides a lack of a systematic analysis of the institutions that influence activism. 
In addition, no study was found that adopts Resource-Based View or Austrian 
economics to explain the use of shareholder activism as a source of active 
entrepreneurial choice. As for the practical reasons, a study from IFC and 
Mercer (2009) found that activism is not yet a priority in the emerging markets, 
as less than one third of the surveyed investment managers admitted having a 
policy or practice of engagement. Therefore, there is need to understand more 
in-depth the reasons why this is happening. 
This research will have both academic and practical benefits. Academically, this 
research will develop the literature on shareholder activism in emerging 
markets. Moreover, this study will also be of interest to institutionalists, RVB 
academics and Austrian economics since, as it will be demonstrated, these 
theories prove to be effective to analyse shareholder activism. Practically, this 
research aims at helping investors to design global shareholder activism 
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strategies by identifying the factors that enhance or curb activism in emerging 
markets.  
 
1.1. Aims and objectives 
 
This research will explore what promotes or inhibits the development of 
shareholder activism in emerging markets based on Institutional Theory, 
Resource-Based View and Austrian economics. It is expected that the results of 
this study will lead to the development of a framework that systematically 
analyses the determinants of shareholder activism in emerging markets.    
 
1.2. Research question and hypotheses 
 
Research question: What are the factors that influence the development of 
shareholder activism in emerging markets? 
 
International institutions: 
 
H1: The higher the level of international capital inflows the higher the level of 
shareholder activism in the country. 
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H2: The higher the hiring of international consulting services the higher the level 
of shareholder activism in the country. 
H3: The higher the level of exposure of managers to Anglo-American education 
the higher the level of shareholder activism in the country. 
H4: The higher the number of PRI signatories the higher the level of 
shareholder activism in the country. 
 
Domestic institutions: 
 
H5a: The higher the legal protection to shareholders the higher the level of 
shareholder activism in the country. 
H5b: The stronger the judicial enforcement the higher the level of shareholder 
activism adopted in the country. 
H5c: The higher the level of non-governmental enforcement the higher the level 
of shareholder activism adopted in the country. 
H6: The level of blockholders in the ownership structure affects the level of 
shareholder activism by majority shareholders adopted in the country. 
H7: National culture affects the level of shareholder activism in the country. 
H8: The influence of religion affects the level of shareholder activism in the 
country. 
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H9: The higher the level of stock lending the lower the level of shareholder 
activism in the country. 
H10: The higher the stock turnover the lower the level of shareholder activism in 
the country. 
 
Organisational institutions: 
 
H11a: The characteristics of the investor influence its likelihood to be an active 
shareholder. 
H11b: Larger investors have a stronger incentive to engage due to resource 
availability. 
H12: The level of diversification of the investor portfolio affects the level of 
shareholder activism of the investor. 
 
Strategic motivations: 
 
H13: Investors adopt shareholder activism to gain strategic advantage and to 
respond to entrepreneurial foresight. 
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1.3. Structure of the dissertation 
 
Chapter Two refers to a thorough analysis of the literature in terms of the 
factors that influence shareholder activism in emerging markets. This chapter 
will discuss Institutional Theory and shareholder activism. Further, it will explore 
Institutional Theory in the areas of corporate governance (CG) and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), which are proxy concepts to shareholder activism. 
All the sections above will examine the emerging markets‟ context. This chapter 
will also examine Resource-Based View and Austrian economics in explaining 
strategic CSR. Later, hypotheses will be developed concerning the 
determinants of shareholder activism. 
In Chapter Three, the methodology to be adopted to conduct this research will 
be discussed. This research will adopt a critical realist philosophical approach. 
The methods will be mixed and composed of two stages. Firstly, statistical 
analysis will be employed regarding the relationship between shareholder 
activism in emerging markets and institutional factors. The second stage will be 
composed by semi-structured interviews with a number of institutional investors 
from emerging markets to investigate to what extent they adopt shareholder 
activism for strategic reasons.  
Chapter Four will present the conclusions of this research, limitations and 
avenues for future research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction: Chapter Two refers to a thorough analysis of the literature related 
to the factors that influence shareholder (or investor) activism in emerging 
markets. Firstly, this chapter will discuss institutional theory and shareholder 
activism. Further, it will explore the links between institutional theory and 
corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility (CSR), which are 
proxy concepts to investor activism. All the sections above will examine the 
emerging markets‟ context. This chapter will also explore Resource-Based View 
and Austrian economics as useful theories to analyse CSR. Afterwards, a few 
hypotheses concerning the determinants of shareholder activism will be 
developed. The purpose of this chapter is theoretical development through the 
generation of hypotheses for investigation at a later stage. 
 
2.1. Institutional Theory 
 
This section provides a brief description of Institutional Theory and analyses the 
state of institutions in emerging countries. 
According to North (1990, p. 3), “institutions are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction”. Such constraints include not only the 
conditions which prohibit individuals from acting, but also those which allow 
them to undertake certain activities. Institutions are comprised of formal rules, 
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informal rules and enforcement. Formal rules are represented by constitutions, 
laws, policies and formal agreements. Informal rules are composed of norms of 
behaviour, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct, and enforcement 
can be imposed by the rules or by other actors, such as the state or the society. 
The main aim of the institutions consists of reducing uncertainty and creating 
order through the establishment of a stable structure to everyday life (North 
1990; North 1991). 
In Institutional Theory, while institutions are considered to be the “rules of the 
game”, the organisations are the “players” (North 1991). Organisations are 
influenced by the institutional environment in which they function (Doh and 
Guay 2006), enabling them to act, through the provision of more positive 
incentives and rewards, or not, through rules and negative sanctions or 
punishments (Campbell 2006).  
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), institutional isomorphism explains 
behaviour within firms. Organisations are considered social and cultural 
systems and, as such, seek legitimacy within the institutional environment. This 
search for legitimacy converges to create isomorphism, which is generated 
through coercive, mimetic or normative processes.  
Coercive isomorphism is the response to formal and informal pressures that are 
borne on organizations by other organisations upon which they are dependent 
and by societal expectations. Such pressures include force, persuasion or 
invitation to join a collusion. The most common type of coercive isomorphism is 
legislation by which organisations must abide in order to operate legally. 
Organisations can also be persuaded to act due to pressures exerted by NGOs 
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and campaign groups (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). One example is the Shell-
Greenpeace case. When Shell decided to sink the Brent Spar oil storage facility 
in 1994 following the platform‟s dismantlement, Greenpeace led a large public 
campaign against the disposal, backed up by substantial public support. Even 
though the company believed that the sea disposal was the best environmental 
option, Shell abandoned its plan due to the insurmountable public battle 
(Diermeier 1996). 
The second and third forms of isomorphism are more difficult to differentiate 
(Matten and Moon 2008). Mimetic isomorphism refers to the tendency of social 
actors to imitate others that are viewed as successful and legitimate. This form 
of isomorphism draws on conditions of uncertainty. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) 
cites the efforts of the Japanese government in the nineteenth century to 
modernise by sending officers to Europe and the US to study successful 
structures (e.g. postal, court, navy, army, banking) to later be applied in the 
country. 
The third mechanism is normative isomorphism. Universities, consultancy firms 
and professional organizations act as disseminators of appropriate 
organizational practices, which are then adopted by firms (Abernethy and Chua 
1996). Usually, large organisations hire the same few consulting firms, helping 
spread the same management models. The filtering of personnel also leads to 
uniformisation. Corporate managers are likely to be drawn from the same 
universities and are filtered on a common set of attributes. As a result, they view 
problems similarly and approach decisions in the same way (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1991). 
9 
 
Comparative research has extended DiMaggio and Powell‟s neoinstitutional 
theory by observing how institutional contexts differ across countries (Crouch 
2005 cited in Jackson and Apostolakou 2009; Whitley 1999). While Whitley 
(1999) calls these specific institutional frameworks „national business system, 
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) refer to it as „social system of production‟ and 
Hall and Soskice (2001) name it “varieties of capitalism”.  
Whitley (1999) provides a framework for comparing the different ways in which 
countries organise their economic activities. Such organisation can be analysed 
according to (i) ownership coordination; (ii) non-ownership coordination; and (iii) 
employment relations and work management. Whitley (1999)‟s framework leads 
to six types of business systems: fragmented, coordinated industrial district, 
compartimentalised, state organised, collaborative and highly coordinated. A 
more detailed analysis of the differences between the types of business 
systems are shown in the table below: 
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Table 2-1 – Types of business systems (Whitley 1999, p. 42) 
 
Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) focus on which institutions render economic 
activity effective. According to them, „social systems of production‟ are 
represented by the institutions and structures of a country integrated into a 
social configuration. Economies can be classified according to volume (mass 
production or low production), competition by quality (high or low) and speed of 
adjustment (flexible or standardised). The authors categorise the economies 
into Flexible Systems of Production (FSP) and Diversified Quality Mass 
Production (DQMP). While FSP emphasises economy of scope and low-
Characteristics Fragmented 
Coordinated 
industrial 
district 
Compartimentalised 
State 
organised 
Collaborative 
Highly 
coordinated 
Owner control direct Direct Market Direct Alliance Alliance 
Ownership 
integration of 
production 
chains 
low Low High High High Some 
Ownership 
integration of 
sectors 
Low Low High 
Some to 
high 
Limited Limited 
Alliance 
coordination of 
production 
chains 
Low Limited Low Low Limited High 
Collaboration 
between 
competitors 
Low Some Low Low High High 
Alliance 
coordination of 
sectors 
Low Low Low Low low some 
Employer-
employee 
interdependence 
Low Some Low Low Some High 
Delegation to 
employees 
Low some Low Low high considerable 
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production of diverse products, DQMP functions better in environments in which 
technologies change rapidly. 
Hall and Soskice‟s (2001) „varieties of capitalism‟ focus on the firm as the main 
player in the society and are concerned about incentive structures and 
efficiency goals (Lane 2003). The national political economies are compared 
based on how the firms solve problems in five dimensions: industrial relations, 
vocational training and education, corporate governance and employees. These 
varieties of capitalism range from Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) to 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). In LMEs, the supply and demand are 
regulated by market forces and formal contracts. Examples of LMEs are the US, 
the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland. In CMEs, firms depend 
less on market mechanisms and more on the cooperation of the different 
players in the market. Examples of CMEs are Germany, Japan, the Netherlands 
and Belgium. Hall and Soskice (2001) claim that both market economies can 
offer good levels of economic performance in the long run. These economies 
differ in how employment and income are distributed. LMEs engage more in 
paid employment and income inequality is higher. In CMEs, working hours are 
shorter and income more equal. 
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2.1.1. Institutions in emerging markets 
 
It is noteworthy to mention the differences in the level of formalisation of the 
institutional arrangements in developed and in emerging markets, particularly in 
the regulation arena.  
In developed countries, there are often effective judicial systems that include 
well-specified bodies of law, lawyers, arbitrators and mediators. In contrast, in 
developing countries, enforcement is usually uncertain because of ambiguity of 
legal doctrines as well as uncertainty with respect to behaviour of the enforcer 
(North 1990). 
This does not mean, though, that businesses cannot succeed in these 
environments. Wood and Frynas (2005) cite the example of successful 
companies in East African economies, such as Kenya and Tanzania. Usually, 
Asian-owned firms are found to be more successful than the Black African firms 
in this region because Asian entrepreneurs have higher formal education, 
usually acquired abroad (in the US, Europe or Australia) and they rely on the 
assistance of foreign business networks. 
Companies in emerging markets can also adapt to their institutional 
environments to do business.  For instance, in the e-commerce industry in 
China, the telecommunications are considered inefficient, the payment 
mechanisms are inconvenient, the products present poor quality, the delivery is 
unreliable and there are concerns about the trust in the legal system. Hence, 
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the Chinese rely greatly on personal trust („guanxi1), depending on their 
networks of family, friends and colleagues to guarantee the trust that the 
domestic institutions do not provide. In contrast, in the US, there is a well-
developed structure for payment, business processes are highly formalised and 
the legal enforcement is reliable (Martinsons 2008). Thus, businesses do not 
need to rely on personal trust because there are legal safeguards in case the 
relationship fails (Welter et al. 2004). 
According to Ginsburg (2005), many countries are committing to international 
enforcement mechanisms to overcome the lack of formalisation in the domestic 
institutional environment. The international institutions are acting as substitutes 
for weak domestic institutions. Santhakumar (2003) mentions that citizens‟ 
actions are also partially replacing weak institutional structures. In economies 
where there is poor enforcement of environmental regulations and long delays 
in settling matters through the courts, the citizens are being compelled to sue 
the polluters or take direct actions that are costly to the polluter. 
The discussion of the institutional influences on emerging markets is pertinent 
for this research as there is a possibility that different institutions have different 
effects on the level of shareholder activism in the comparison of developed and 
emerging markets.  
 
 
                                                             
1 Relationships between two or more people or organisations that rely on each other for help (Martinsons 
2008). 
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2.2. Shareholder activism 
 
This section will analyse the literature on shareholder activism, particularly its 
definitions, main strategies, drivers and obstacles and the state of activism in 
emerging markets. 
Shareholder activism or active share ownership occurs when “shareholders 
make use of their rights in order to monitor, and sometimes influence, how the 
companies they invest in manage ESG issues” (Eurosif 2006, p. 9). 
Shareholder activism is also known as shareholder engagement (The 
Institutional Shareholders‟ Committee 2007; IFC and Mercer 2009; Van den 
Bergue and Louche 2005) or active share ownership (PRI 2009a; Eurosif 2006). 
For the purpose of this study, the term adopted will be activism (as used by 
Sullivan and Mackenzie 2006 and Sjostrom 2008) so as to differentiate from the 
concept of dialogue between investors and the companies. 
According to Martin et al. (2007), there are five main types of investor activism: 
indirect or laissez-faire, external, internal, negotiatory and direct. Indirect 
activism refers to the concession of corporate control to management which is 
disciplined through exit, threat of exit or capital withdrawal. External activism 
accounts for interventions by the investors in the capital market and it is 
disciplined through disciplinary action such as shareholder resolutions. The third 
type of activism, internal engagement, involves investors influencing the internal 
governance of the company through the appointment of independent and non-
executive directors in the board of directors. Fourthly, the negotiatory activism 
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refers to investors influencing the strategic and operational matters within 
management. Finally, direct activism involves blockholders controlling 
management directly through hiring and firing of directors. 
 
2.2.1. Drivers and obstacles to shareholder activism 
 
Investors are driven to engage with the companies in which they invest for a 
number of reasons. First of all, investors engage with companies with the aim of 
enhancing financial performance (Amalric 2004). Studies by authors such as 
Bizjak and Marquette (1998), Gompers et al. (2003), Opler and Sokobin (1995), 
Smith (1996) and Strickland et al. (1996) demonstrate that shareholder activism 
leads to increases in company value. However, the studies about the financial 
benefits of shareholder activism reached mixed conclusions. While some 
studies demonstrate that activism enhances financial performance, others show 
a negative relationship or a neutral one (e.g. Core et al. 1996; Del Guercio and 
Hawking 1999; Faccio and Lasfer 2000). A summary of the studies that 
measure the effects of activism on financial performance are shown in Appendix 
1. 
A second driver that leads investors to engage concerns ethical motives 
(Amalric 2004; McLaren 2004; Ryan and Dennis 2003). Ethically-minded 
investors might be willing to trade higher financial performance for investing in 
more responsible companies (Amalric 2004). McLaren (2004) argues that 
shareholders may share with non-shareholders a common interest in collective 
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social benefits. One example is the pressure that investors put on companies 
investing in South Africa during Apartheid (Teoh et al. 1999) or in Sudan due to 
the genocide in Darfur (PRI 2009b). 
Investor activism has also been used by passive investors who cannot exit 
because their investments are indexed (McLaren 2004). This is especially 
relevant in the UK where there is a clear increase in institutional assets 
managed passively, mostly in the pension fund environment (IMA 2010), as 
seen in the figure below. 
 
Figure 2-1 – Use of passive and active management in the UK (IMA 2010) 
 
 
Another motivation for investors to be more active relates to the pressure of 
different stakeholders, such as NGOs, trade associations and governmental 
bodies to encourage better social and environmental performance from 
corporations (Dresner 2002). In the UK, the Local Authority Pension Fund 
Forum (2006) and the Institutional Shareholders‟ Committee (2007) are both 
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encouraging investors to engage with their portfolio companies through 
statements of principles. In the US, NGOs such as Amnesty International and 
Genocide Intervention Network have called investors to boycott companies that 
are operating in Sudan (IFC and Teri 2009a). 
As for the impediments to activism, one of them refers to engagement costs. 
While only one investor engage with companies to improve performance, all 
investors rip the benefits, leading to a free rider problem (Clark and Hebb 2004). 
This is why larger investors or a collective group of investors have stronger 
motivations to engage as they have more resources to bear the monitoring 
costs (Gillan and Starks 2000). It is also argued that spending money on 
activism is contrary to the fiduciary duty that investment managers have 
towards the beneficiaries. To some, spending money on engagement is seen 
contrary to the beneficiaries‟ interests (Clark and Hebb 2004) 
Moreover, regulation can act as discouraging active investing. In some 
emerging markets, the legislation prevents foreign institutions from voting or it 
restricts foreign share ownership (Gillan and Starks 2003). In China, for 
instance, the law restricts the amount of share ownership by institutional 
investors to 10%, curbing further engagement (Kurt et al. 2009). 
 
2.2.2. Shareholder activism in emerging markets 
 
The literature on shareholder activism in emerging markets is very restricted. 
However, contrary to Sjostrom (2008), who did not find academic literature on 
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the topic, the researcher found a couple of journal articles and non-academic 
reports.  
Choi and Cho (2003) and Jang and Kim (2002) investigated shareholder 
activism in South Korea. Choi and Cho (2003) examined the shareholder 
activism activities of the People‟s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 
(PSPD), an activist group that promotes engagement in South Korea. They 
found that the initiative did not improve performance in the target firms. The low 
change of such of activism suggests that managers and controlling 
shareholders of the chaebols2 are very resistant. Jang and Kim (2002) also 
studied the PSPD, focusing on the case study of Korea‟s Samsung Electronics 
Corporation. The results demonstrate again that the corporate leaders are 
unwilling to change and improve corporate governance in the country. It is 
noteworthy to mention, though, that these studies were conducted prior to the 
Asian financial crisis. Chang and Shin (2006) found that, after the crisis, the role 
of foreign institutional investors as outside monitors has increased in the 
country, affecting the changes in CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance. 
In terms of non-academic studies, in 2009, Mercer, sponsored by the IFC, 
published “Gaining Ground: Integrating Environmental, Social and Governance 
(ESG) Factors into Investment Processes”, rating the ESG practices of fund 
managers in China, India, South Korea and Brazil (IFC and Mercer 2009). The 
survey found that sustainable investing in emerging markets grew to more than 
US$300 billion and that less than one third of the managers surveyed have a 
policy or practice of engagement with investee companies. 
                                                             
2 Korean business groups of companies that have controlling shareholders (Moskalev and Park 2009) 
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The IFC also funded country reports on Brazil (IFC and Teri 2009b), China (IFC 
and BSR 2009) and India (IFC and Teri 2009a). In Brazil, shareholder 
engagement is considered young. The report describes only one engagement 
activity focused on labour standards in charcoal producers associated with 
Brazil‟s iron and steel production. In China, foreign investors find some 
challenges to engage with Chinese companies, such as the language barrier, 
the cultural differences and the lack of proxy services (IFC and BSR 2009). In 
India, only a few foreign investors and NGOs are engaging with multinationals 
and Indian companies towards ESG issues (IFC and Teri 2009a). 
This section demonstrates the definition and strategies of shareholder activism, 
the different motivations for employing it and the information related to activism 
in emerging markets. However, there appears to be a gap in the literature in 
terms of a systematic analysis of the institutional factors that influence 
shareholder activism, particularly in emerging markets which the academic 
literature has failed to properly address. This research will aim at filling such 
gap. 
 
2.3. Institutional Theory and corporate governance 
 
In this section, a literature review of the relationship between Institutional 
Theory and corporate governance will be provided. Shareholder activism is one 
of the practices of corporate governance and the latter has been widely 
examined under the institutional theory lens (cf. Aguilera and Jackson 2003; 
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Buck and Shahrim 2005). This section will present the definition of corporate 
governance, the debate surrounding comparative corporate governance and 
studies that relate institutional theory and corporate governance, including 
studies in emerging markets. 
According to Parkinson (1994 cited in Solomon 2007, p. 13), corporate 
governance is “the process of supervision and control intended to ensure that 
the company‟s management acts in accordance with the interests of 
shareholders”. Similarly, The Corporate Governance Handbook (1996 cited in 
Solomon 2007, p. 13) describes it as “the relationship between shareholders 
and their companies and the way in which shareholders act to encourage best 
practice”. 
Corporate governance was created to address agency problems, which occurs 
when the interests of management (agents) are in conflict with the interests of 
the shareholders (owners). Agency problems exist when agents misappropriate 
firm‟s resources, avoid tasks to meet corporate goals or prioritise personal 
interests instead of the firms‟ needs (Juravle and Lewis 2008; Sapienza et al. 
2000). In this context, corporate governance aims to ensure that the firm 
operates efficiently from the perspective of the shareholders (Fama and Jensen 
1983; Aguilera et al. 2008).  
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2.3.1. Comparative corporate governance 
 
As noted, the definitions of corporate governance above are focused on the 
relationship between shareholders and companies‟ management. However, 
several authors (e.g. Chizema and Buck 2006; Aguilera et al. 2008) contend 
that such concepts represent a narrow view of corporate governance by not 
contextualising it. 
Similarly to Hall and Soskice (2001)‟s classification, Chizema and Buck (2006) 
categorise the world of corporate governance as „market-based capitalism‟ and 
„cooperative capitalism‟. These groups are also called shareholder and 
stakeholder-oriented (Lee and Yoo 2008; Aguilera et al. 2006). The market-
based capitalism is represented by countries such as the US, the UK, Canada 
and Australia, while the cooperative capitalism is represented by countries such 
as Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and Austria. The concept of corporate 
governance in the first group is restricted to shareholders. The governance 
system in these countries depends on high levels of disclosure to inform 
investors while the rights of minority shareholders are protected by law. 
Managers are rewarded or punished on market-based mechanisms. For the 
second group, the focus of corporate governance is not only addressed at 
shareholders, but at all other stakeholders, such as employees, the bank and 
the state. This model is often characterised by a bank-centred system 
(Yoshikawa and McGuire 2008). Managers are weakly influenced by stock 
prices and strongly influenced by the stakeholders (Noteboom 1999). 
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With the advent of globalisation, the discussion related to the convergence or 
divergence of corporate governance led to four different positions (Lane 2003): 
functional conversion, system persistence, hybridisation and complementarity.   
In functional conversion, the systems are argued to transform and converge. A 
few authors (e.g. Hansmann and Kraakman 2001; Coffee 1999; Gilson 2001; 
Lane 2003) understand that the world is progressing to a corporate governance 
convergence towards the Anglo-American model in view of the competitive 
pressures of global capital and product markets. This has been Lane (2003)‟s 
position regarding the effect of globalisation in the German governance system, 
although she notes that it will take some time until national features are 
replaced by global ones (Lane 2003 cited in Wood and Frynas 2003). 
The second position claims for system persistence and partial adjustment to the 
existing model. In this model, there is weak convergence and some learning 
from each other between the different national systems (Bratton and McCahery 
1999). A few authors (e.g. Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Lee et al. 2003; 
O‟Sullivan 2003; Nestor and Thompson 2000) contend that the diversity in 
corporate governance systems will be maintained due to the different 
institutional contents which help shape the systems. Mayer (2000 cited in 
Solomon 2010) denies corporate governance convergence overall, suggesting 
that systems should remain differently to take advantage of comparative 
advantage. 
The third position claims that there will be the emergence of a hybrid model. 
This is the position defended by Sarra and Nakahigashi (2002), Jackson (2009) 
and Yoshikawa et al. (2007). Sarra and Nakahigashi (2002, p. 301) assert that 
23 
 
“while there is some convergence, particularly as corporations deal across 
borders, there are equally strong political, social, and economic influences such 
that there is unlikely to be complete convergence of corporate governance 
models”. Jackson (2009, p. 624) cites Japan, stating that “the new „hybrid‟ 
pattern of corporate governance involves a mix of elements from the „old‟ 
Japanese model and „new‟ more Anglo-American practices”. Yoshikawa et al. 
(2007) found that Japanese firms tend to select features of the Anglo-American 
model and tailor them to fit their local contexts. 
The fourth position suggests that there will be the establishment of a new 
institutional complementarity between the new and the old system. According to 
Lane (2003), hybridisation can only be temporary because complementarity 
does not exist and different parts are dominated by different logics. A few 
authors (e.g. Hoepner 2001; Hoepner and Jackson 2001; Streeck 2001; Beyer 
and Hassel 2002 cited in Lane 2003) argue that the logic of the capital market 
will be combined with the system of codetermination and democratic 
participation existent in Germany. 
 
2.3.2. Relationship between Institutional Theory and corporate governance 
 
Among the authors that have researched on the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and institutional factors, some (e.g. Li and Harrisson 
2008; La Porta et al. 1998) investigated the contextual factors of corporate 
governance in general, while others (e.g. Chizema and Buck 2006; Aguilera et 
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al. 2006; Jackson 2009) assessed corporate governance in specific 
environments.  
For instance, Li and Harrison (2008) found a relationship between national 
culture and board composition. Companies that are based in risk avoiding 
cultures tend to present more outside directors on their boards because more 
diverse groups bring different skills and abilities to solve complex problems and 
to deal with different types of situations. Firms based in individualistic cultures 
also present more outside directors so that different people can represent the 
interests of different stakeholders. The preference for more outside directors is 
also shared by societies with more cooperative values (femininity) and lower 
power distance, as a board with fewer management directors conforms to the 
norm of larger power distance between CEOs and their subordinates. 
In terms of legal systems and corporate governance, La Porta et al. (1998) 
investigated 49 countries and found that the French civil law tradition offers low 
investor protection, the German and Scandinavian system offer moderate 
protection and the Anglo-American common law offers the highest investor 
protection. 
Among the studies that look at specific environments, Chizema (2008) 
researched the suitability of executive compensation disclosure and the 
executive stock option (ESO) mechanism in Germany. He noted that the 
disclosure of individual executive compensation is not suitable for the German 
environment due to the existence of co-determination, where employee voice is 
supported through politics (Jackson and Moerke 2005). As boards are 
comprised of representatives of the employees, the disclosure of individual 
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executive compensation could have a negative outcome by being later used in 
collective bargaining. 
 
2.3.3. Institutional Theory and corporate governance in emerging markets 
 
A few studies were found about the relationship between Institutional Theory 
and corporate governance in emerging markets. One of them is from Reed 
(2002) who found that emerging markets are drawn to adopt Anglo-American 
models of corporate governance. International organisations such as the World 
Bank and the IMF have imposed a series of liberalising measures when 
negotiating loans, which include governance reforms with an Anglo-American 
perspective.  
Siddiqui (2010) also points that the requisites of these international financial 
agencies as prerequisites for obtaining loans led developing countries to adopt 
Anglo-American corporate governance practices. The author examines 
corporate governance in Bangladesh and concludes that the Anglo-American 
system is not appropriate for the country. The market-based system is 
considered more adequate where company shares are owned by dispersed 
shareholders and managers are freer from close scrutiny and control. In 
contrast, the country is characterised by high ownership concentration, 
reluctance of firms to raise capital through the stock market and high degree of 
bank borrowing (Siddiqui 2010). Rwegasira (2000) mentions that the German 
governance model may be more appropriate for Africa due to its low degree of 
stock market sophistication and domination of bank financing. The lack of 
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strong institutions is another argument for the inappropriateness of the Anglo-
American model. One important basis for the American model is that the legal 
system can uphold contracts, investors are sophisticated and there are qualified 
personnel to supplement the capital markets (Siddiqui 2010). However, as 
mentioned by Paredes (2005), the emerging economies lack „second order 
institutions‟, such as experienced investment bankers, lawyers, security 
analysts and effective judicial systems that enable the markets to work 
effectively. 
This section demonstrates that the literature available on the institutional 
influences on corporate governance is wide, but focused on the contrast 
between liberal and coordinated markets. Therefore, more research is 
necessary to tackle the literature gap on emerging markets. The analysis of the 
determinants of corporate governance systems in different countries will be 
employed when developing the hypothesis concerning the factors that affect 
shareholder activism, as shown in Section 2.6. 
 
2.4. Institutional Theory and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) 
 
This section will discuss the relationship between Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and Institutional Theory. Considering that this study is 
focusing on shareholder activism that targets ESG issues, Corporate Social 
Responsibility is a relevant subject due to the ESG issues it encompasses. This 
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section will define CSR and then proceed to examine studies that deal with the 
relationship between Institutional Theory and CSR, including studies in the 
context of emerging markets. 
CSR is a contested and dynamic concept (Matten and Moon 2008). Matten and 
Moon (2008, p. 46) define CSR as “clearly articulated and communicated 
policies and practices of corporations that reflect business responsibility for 
some of the wider societal good”. Carroll and Buchholtz (2000 cited in Crane 
and Matten 2006) characterize CSR as encompassing the economic, legal, 
ethical and philanthropic expectations placed on organisations by society at a 
given point in time. By economic responsibilities, the authors refer to 
responsibilities related to issues such as dividends to shareholders, fair wages 
to employees and fair product prices to customers. The legal responsibility 
demands that firms abide by the law. The ethical responsibility obliges 
corporations to do what is fair and just. Finally, the philanthropic responsibility is 
under the companies‟ discretion and encompasses activities related to 
improving the quality of life of employees, of the local communities and of 
society. 
 
2.4.1. Relationship between Institutional Theory and CSR 
 
The relationship between institutional theory and CSR has been covered in the 
literature. Some addressed the relationship briefly as part of their research 
findings (e.g. Chapple and Moon 2005; Maignan and Ralston 2002), others 
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discussed it in more detail (e.g. Campbell 2007; Katz et al. 2001) and a few 
focused on the comparison between Europe/UK and the US (e.g. Doh and 
Guay 2006; Aaronson 2003). 
The works of Chapple and Moon (2005) and Maignan and Ralston (2002) found 
that the CSR differences across countries were attributed to institutional 
differences. While Chapple and Moon (2005) researched about CSR in seven 
countries in Asia, Margolis et al. (2002) studied the CSR public commitment of 
firms in France, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. However, neither Maignan 
and Ralston (2002) nor Chapple and Moon (2005) explored further the 
institutional implications of their findings, differently from Campbell (2007) and 
others, as shown below. 
Campbell (2007) argues that CSR behaviour is associated with a variety of 
institutional factors. Firstly, companies are more likely to behave in a 
responsible manner when they are experiencing stronger financial performance. 
On the other hand, in case companies operate in a very competitive 
environment, firms are less likely to invest in CSR activities due to the narrow 
profit margins. The same is true in low competitive environments, as investing in 
CSR does not lead to an increase in sales or profits. Secondly, corporations are 
more likely to be responsible if there is a well-enforced state and industry 
regulations to ensure such behaviour. Furthermore, enforcement, not only from 
state agencies but also from NGOs and the media activism, is conducive to 
more responsible behaviour. NGOs, for instance, can employ various tactics, 
such as appealing directly to the corporations, pressuring governments to act 
and bringing public attention to particular matters (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
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Campbell (2007) also considers that normative institutions contribute to 
responsible behaviour, for example, through the influence of business schools 
curricula, business publications and business associations. Finally, legal 
institutions that facilitate the dialogue between companies and their 
stakeholders influence responsible behaviour. One example of legal institution 
is the co-determination in Germany which guarantees employee participation in 
the board of directors. 
Jackson and Apostolakou (2010) compared the influence of different 
institutional environments on CSR policies in Europe. They concluded that firms 
from more Liberal Economies scored higher on most dimensions of CSR than 
firms from Coordinated Market Economies as CSR practices act as substitutes 
for institutionalised forms of stakeholder involvement. Moreover, firms with high 
environmental impact adopt more extensive CSR practices.  
Katz et al. (2001) examined how the institution of national culture impacts the 
multinationals‟ host country expectations of CSR. The authors studied five 
different issues to link to national culture: consumerism, environment, treatment 
of employees, government involvement in society and the role of business in 
community affairs. Based on the literature, the authors found that countries that 
place higher value on environmental protection are likely to be low in power 
distance (as low power distance countries are usually represented by the 
industrialised countries), high in uncertainty avoidance (because they are 
concerned to reducing the risk to environmental harm), low in individualism and 
low in masculinity (as individualists and masculine societies place more 
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importance to development than to the environment). This same analysis was 
conducted to the remaining four issues, as shown in Appendix 2.  
Additionally, a few authors concentrated on studying the differences between 
the US and Europe/UK in different CSR topics. Aaronson (2003), for instance, 
compared and contrasted the British and the American approaches to CSR 
policies, concluding that, although both countries share similar cultural and 
political contexts, the CSR models are different. While, in the UK, CSR is 
supported by businesses, by the government and by the civil society in the US, 
the initiatives are contradictory and unconnected. 
Matten and Moon (2008) attribute to the differences in business systems the 
fact that CSR in the US is more explicit, while the approach in Europe is 
predominantly implicit. By explicit CSR, the authors refer to voluntary programs 
and strategies that address societal issues. By explicit CSR, they refer to 
mandatory and customary requirements to address stakeholder issues. 
Furthermore, the authors note that there is a gradual rise of explicit CSR in 
Europe which is explained by a series of changes in the European business 
systems. There have been political changes in the European landscape in 
terms of the current capacity of the welfare state to deal with social problems. In 
the labour systems, the labour market is being deregulated and the trade unions 
and industry associations are losing power. In the financial arena, the European 
corporations are increasingly more dependent on the stock market to raise 
capital. Moreover, there is increasing public awareness of the impact of 
multinationals followed by a rise in public expectations. 
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Doh and Guay (2006) also compared Europe and the US in relation to the 
incentives to businesses and interest groups to influence government policies. 
One of the main differences between both systems is the political structure 
encouraging businesses to influence government policy. While in the US, the 
federalist structure hinders the opportunities to influence policy, in Europe, the 
centralised aspect and the role of the European Union encourage it. Moreover, 
in the European countries and in the European Union, interest groups have a 
more formalised role in the public policy process (Wilson 2003 cited in Doh and 
Guay 2006) and are more likely to employ a collaborative approach to policy 
making (Marks and McAdam 1996 cited in Doh and Guay 2006). 
 
2.4.2. Institutional Theory and CSR in emerging markets 
 
According to the literature, the institutions in the emerging markets influence the 
level of CSR sophistication and its priorities (e.g. Jamali et al. 2008; Visser 
2008). 
Jamali et al. (2008) investigated the perceptions of Lebanese managers 
towards CSR and found that the managers perceive limited institutional 
pressures to CSR in the local context. Hence, such limited pressures are 
translated into the limited sophistication of CSR, which acquires mainly a 
philanthropic approach. 
Visser (2006) reached similar conclusions, positing that the priorities of CSR in 
emerging markets are different from the priorities of developed markets due to 
the limited economic development. Visser (2006) adopted Carroll (1991)‟s 
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pyramid model of CSR to propose that, for the African context, the pyramid 
must be reshuffled. Firstly, the economic responsibility receives the most 
emphasis given the region‟s high unemployment, poverty and debt. Secondly, 
the philanthropic responsibility is praised as a way to improve the communities 
where the businesses operate. Thirdly, the legal responsibility is emphasized, 
followed by the ethical responsibility. Considering that the corruption in the 
continent is rather high, ethics remains the lowest priority. 
To conclude this section, a few authors discussed the relationship between 
Institutional Theory and Corporate Social Responsibility, mostly focused on the 
comparison between UK/Europe and the US. In the emerging markets context, 
the limited amount of literature found on the topic demonstrate that domestic 
institutions affect CSR differently than in developed countries. The institutional 
factors that contribute to enhanced CSR will be examined so as to build 
hypothesis, shown in Section 2.6. 
 
2.5. Strategic approach 
 
This section will conceptualise the Resource-Based View (RBV) and the 
Austrian economics theories and look at how they were applied in the literature 
to analyse strategic CSR.  
As seen from the previous chapter sections, Institutional Theory is an effective 
theory to analyse the external influences that affect corporate governance and 
CSR. Hence, such theory will be used to analyse shareholder activism further 
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below (on Section 2.6). However, Institutional Theory fails to explain 
shareholder activism when used as an active strategic choice. Frynas (2008) 
contends that, in the CSR domain, active strategic choice can be explained by 
the Resource-Based View (RBV) and by rational Austrian economics. He posits 
that these theories help clarify the use of CSR as source of competitive 
advantage and as a response to entrepreneurial foresight.  
The Resource-Based View (RBV) of the firm proposes that the firms‟ success is 
largely defined by the resources they own and control (Litz 1996; Galbreath 
2005). Firm resources include all assets, capabilities, processes, attributes, 
information and knowledge that allow the company to implement strategies that 
improve its efficiency (Daft 1983 cited in Barney 1991). According to Baron 
(2001), CSR is strategic if it is a profit-maximisation strategy. CSR can 
contribute to the companies‟ differentiation strategies through product or 
process innovation or through incorporating CSR in their marketing strategies 
(McWilliams et al. 2006; McWilliams and Siegel 2001). A product with CSR 
characteristics may be more attractive, such as the case of fuel-efficient hybrid 
cars, because they are perceived by the consumers to contribute to 
environmental protection. Some customers may be willing to pay a premium 
price for a product with CSR characteristics. CSR can also contribute to the 
corporation‟s reputation building and maintenance (Baron 2001) when CSR is 
incorporated in the marketing strategies. In this case, firms will gain competitive 
advantage due to their CSR characteristics or CSR managerial practices 
(McWilliams et al. 2006; McWilliams and Siegel 2001), such as when a 
company invests in corporate philanthropy. 
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Rational Austrian economics has a different approach. Rational Austrians (e.g. 
Mises 1969; Rothbard 1962) emphasise that humans are capable of conscious 
action (conscious rationality) and they believe in predicting the future reactions 
to the success of most human actions. Rather than relying on resource leverage 
as suggested by RBV, Austrian economics is more concerned with identifying 
and seizing opportunities. This concept is particularly important in turbulent and 
high-velocity environments in which value creation derives from entrepreneurial 
discovery. According to the Austrian perspective, managers should seek 
uncertainty because this is where most invaluable opportunities are found. Also, 
timing is central to the Austrian view as attractive opportunities are considered 
transient (Roberts and Eisenhardt 2003). 
To illustrate the RBV and the Austrian perspective in relation to CSR, Frynas 
(2008) examines the oil industry. It was found that Shell and BP have invested 
in environmental pollution prevention and in local community engagement so as 
to enhance its competitive advantage. This strategic choice is explained by the 
RBV theory. Moreover, both companies have decided to invest heavily in 
renewable energy because they envisage a large market for this type of energy 
in the future. This action is supported by the Austrian theory. On the other hand, 
in emerging markets, Frynas (2008) found that the oil companies investigated 
do not conceive CSR strategies as business opportunities and their CSR 
program is more driven by stakeholder and institutional pressures. 
To sum, the RBV and Austrian perspectives were adopted to explain strategic 
CSR. While RBV have been employed more often to explain strategic CSR 
(Baron 2001; McWilliams et al. 2006; McWilliams and Siegel 2001), only one 
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author (Frynas 2008) explored Austrian economics in the context of CSR. This 
demonstrates a significant gap in the literature. In the next section, these 
theories will be used to suggest that shareholder activism can be used as a 
strategic choice to increase firms‟ competitiveness and to take advantage of 
future opportunities. 
 
2.6. Influential factors and shareholder activism 
 
This section will be drawn on the reviewed literature to develop hypotheses 
about the factors that influence shareholder activism which will be later tested in 
the contexts of emerging markets. 
 
2.6.1. International institutional factors 
 
Drawing on the literature, the international institutions that are likely to influence 
shareholder activism are represented by (i) the international flow of capital; (ii) 
the level of international consulting services; (iii) dissemination of Anglo-
American curricula; and (iv) international regulation and enforcement, as shown 
below. 
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2.6.1.1. International flow of capital 
 
The influence of the flow of capital is part of DiMaggio and Powell‟s (1983) 
coercive mechanism. The international flow of capital can take many forms, 
such as through capital lending from international institutions, selling stocks to 
foreign investors and listing domestic stocks in international stock exchanges. 
Lending is one powerful way to transmit commitment to shareholder value 
(Martin et al. 2007). As mentioned previously, international organisations such 
as the World Bank have changed the corporate governance systems of the 
emerging markets radically by including the adoption of corporate governance 
practices in the prerequisites for obtaining loans (Siddiqui 2010). For instance, 
during the Asian crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Work 
Bank required the Asian economies to adopt the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance as part of their economic reforms (Martin et al. 2007). 
The requirements of foreign investors to increase corporate governance 
standards also help disseminate the Anglo-American governance model. 
France and Japan are examples of countries that have adopted American 
governance practices as a response to the increase of foreign investors (cf. 
Seki 2005; Lee and Yoo 2008). 
Furthermore, countries that are willing to trade stocks in another country are 
coerced to adopt the host country‟s governance practices. Foreign issuers that 
wish to enter the US and UK stock exchange must incur significant legal and 
compliance costs (Yoshikawa and Rasheed 2009). Moreover, European 
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countries that are part of the European Union and wish to trade stocks in 
another European country must comply with the EU regulations (Coffee 1999; 
Dore 2005).  
Considering that these flow of capital mechanisms (lending, inflows from foreign 
investors, listing in foreign stock exchanges) lead to the dissemination of 
shareholder value, it is likely that the practice of shareholder activism will also 
increase.  
 
H1: The higher the level of international capital inflows the higher the level of 
shareholder activism in the country. 
 
2.6.1.2. International consulting services 
 
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991), management models may be 
diffused by consulting firms, especially considering that large organisations 
choose from a small number of major consulting firms. The same is true for 
auditing firms. Major corporations in most countries favour one of the four major 
firms for their audit reports, helping spread the same governance practices 
(Tricker 2009). In the CSR field, consulting firms help transmit the management 
trends that become institutionalised and legitimise the corporations as modern 
companies. The large consulting and accounting firms are transmitting the 
shareholder concept of corporate governance (Martin et al. 2007) and, most 
likely, the concept of shareholder activism. 
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H2: The higher the hiring of international consulting services the higher the level 
of shareholder activism in the country. 
 
2.6.1.3. Academia 
 
Another important organisation that disseminates Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance practices is the academia (Martin et al. 2007). Campbell (2007) 
argues that managers often learn the mental constructs that are learned in 
business schools and in other professional publications. Publications such as 
the Harvard Business Review have increasingly been publishing about CSR, 
and universities in Europe and in the US are including business ethics modules 
in their curricula. 
In terms of shareholder value, students from all over the world are increasingly 
being exposed to the culture of shareholder value (Dore 2005). Many German 
managers, for instance, have been attending US and UK business schools and 
working for American and British corporations. The spread of shareholder 
thinking is also helped by the growth of corporate finance as an academic 
discipline (Martin et al. 2007). Hence, it is likely that these students will be 
influenced by theories related to shareholder value and business ethics and 
place greater importance to shareholder activism, leading to the next 
hypothesis.  
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H3: The higher the level of exposure of managers to Anglo-American education 
the higher the level of shareholder activism in the country. 
 
2.6.1.4. International regulation 
 
Several initiatives are responsible for increasing the level of Social 
Responsibility and corporate governance among the corporate sector. One of 
them is the Global Compact, calling companies to comply with principles related 
to human rights, social and environmental issues (UN Global Compact 2010). 
Another guideline is the Global Reporting Initiative, which offers a framework for 
companies to report on CSR issues (GRI 2010). In the corporate governance 
arena, the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) developed an 
international set of guidelines to improve corporate governance and disclosure 
(Porter and Kramer 2003). 
In terms of responsible investment, The UN Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI 2006) have been the most relevant international institution for 
disseminating the concept of shareholder engagement. The PRI were launched 
in 2005 to promote principles related to the incorporation of ESG issues in the 
investment analysis and decision-making processes of institutional investors 
and investment managers. The PRI currently account for 805 signatories 
including asset owners, investment managers and professional service 
partners3. Among the principles to which signatories commit include the request 
                                                             
3 As of 10th September 2010. 
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to be active asset owners through adopting practices such as engaging with 
invested companies, exercising their voting rights and engaging collaboratively 
(PRI 2009a, PRI 2009b). Hence, it is likely that the growth in the number of PRI 
signatories will lead to an increase in activism practices. 
 
H4: The higher the number of PRI signatories the higher the level of 
shareholder activism in the country. 
 
2.6.2. Domestic institutional factors 
 
The main domestic institutional factors that are likely to affect the level of 
shareholder activism in a country comprise (i) domestic regulations and 
enforcement, (ii) ownership structure, (iii) national culture, (iv) religion, (v) level 
of stock lending, and (vi) stock turnover, which will be presented below. 
 
2.6.2.1. Domestic regulation and enforcement 
 
As far as the influence of legal institutions is concerned, Kurt et al. (2009) cite 
the example of the United Kingdom, claiming that the regulatory framework in 
the United Kingdom incentivises engagement in the country. According to 
Martin et al. (2007), investor activism is incentivised by The Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance and by the ISC‟s Statement of Principles. While The 
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Combined Code on Corporate Governance expects institutional shareholders to 
enter into dialogue with investee companies, the ICS‟s Statement advises 
institutional investors and their agents to make public policies on engagement, 
including the procedures for monitoring investee companies and the rules for 
meetings with senior management (Martin et al. 2007; ISC 2007). 
In Japan and Germany, the law also encourages investor activism, establishing 
that managers must consult more frequently with investors. On the contrary, in 
the United States, financial regulations limit the degree in which corporate 
managers ought to discuss with shareholders, leading managers to be less 
inclined to do so (Campbell 2006). 
Furthermore, common law jurisdictions is considered to provide more secure 
legal protection to shareholders because the judiciary has greater discretion in 
interpreting precedent in common law systems (LaPorta et al. 1999). Hence, it 
is expected that the common law system is also more protective of mechanisms 
for shareholder activism.  
 
H5a: The higher the legal protection to shareholders the higher the level of 
shareholder activism in the country. 
 
Not only the regulatory framework, but also the level of enforcement is 
conducive to influencing shareholder activism. This is especially true in 
emerging economies where the level of enforcement is low and the knowledge 
and specialisation of the judicial system in terms of corporate finance is 
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deficient. For instance, in Brazil, lawsuits dealing with violations of shareholders‟ 
rights are generally handled by the state court judges and not necessarily by 
judges with specialised knowledge in corporate law. Judges are not obliged to 
have any particular training in financial and capital markets (Silveira and Saito 
2009). Paredes (2005) claims that the emerging markets lack „second order 
institutions‟, such as lawyers, and effective judicial systems that enable the 
markets to work effectively. Thus, a high level of legal enforcement can act as 
an additional influence to adopt shareholder activism. 
 
H5b: The stronger the judicial enforcement the higher the level of shareholder 
activism adopted in the country. 
 
Not only state agencies can enforce regulations, but also non-governmental 
organisations and the media. NGOs can employ various tactics, such as 
appealing directly to the corporations, pressuring governments to act and 
bringing public attention to particular matters (Keck and Sikkink 1998). What‟s 
more, the media has played an increasingly important role as a watchdog, 
reporting corporate irresponsible behaviour. As cited by Sullivan and Mackenzie 
(2006), investors have been using the media to communicate their views of 
ESG issues to companies‟ directors, especially because it is impossible for 
investors to meet all invested companies on a face-to-face basis. 
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H5c: The higher the level of non-governmental enforcement the higher the level 
of shareholder activism adopted in the country. 
 
2.6.2.2. Ownership structure 
 
The ownership structure is an additional factor that influences how shareholder 
activism is institutionalised in each country. In countries where there are 
controlling shareholders represented by majority shareholders, blockholders or 
family groupings, such as in Japan and Germany, shareholders have been 
active in directly monitoring companies and making managers highly 
accountable to them (Gillan and Starks 2003; Campbell 2007). Previous studies 
demonstrate that family owners may have superior monitoring abilities in 
comparison to diffused shareholders, especially when family ownership is 
combined with family control over management (Anderson and Reeb 2004). 
Moreover, family owners may have higher interest in monitoring because, as 
they have an interest to preserve the family‟s assets for the next generation, 
they have longer time horizons (Aguilera et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, German and Japanese banks do not take an active role in 
effecting investment and divestment policies to increase shareholder value. 
They intervene only for major financial decisions or when companies are in 
trouble, although they have the power to micromanage (Aoki 1990 cited in Black 
1992; Kallfass 1988 cited in Black 1992; Baums 1998 cited in Bratton and 
McCahery 1999).  
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These findings lead to the next hypothesis: 
 
H6: The level of blockholders in the ownership structure affects the level of 
shareholder activism by majority shareholders adopted in the country. 
 
2.6.2.3. Cultural institution 
 
As it was demonstrated in this literature review, previous studies found a 
relationship between national culture and corporate governance, or national 
culture and CSR. While Li and Harrison (2008) found a relationship between 
national culture and board composition, Katz et al. (2001) found that national 
culture impacts the multinationals‟ host country expectations of CSR. 
Likewise, it is expected that national culture has an effect on shareholder 
activism. For instance, countries that are more long-term oriented may have 
more incentive to engage with companies to promote ESG changes, since 
these are, by nature, long-term issues. Similarly, countries that are lower in 
power distance may feel more comfortable to engage with companies. Also, 
feminine countries may be less willing to engage because they value harmony 
instead of conflicts between parties. These conjectures lead to the next 
hypothesis: 
 
H7: National culture affects the level of shareholder activism in the country. 
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2.6.2.4. Influence of religion 
 
Religion can have an important influence on how management is conducted in 
the country. For example, according to Islam, a firm must be conscious of the 
impact it is promoting on the community (Sulaiman 2000) and investors are 
bound to inform invested companies‟ management when a business transaction 
is not „halal4‟ (ASrIA 2003). 
Likewise, according to Werner (2008), Christianity has an impact on how 
Christian managers behave. These managers may be constrained by a sense 
of responsibility to god and by the awareness that other people might judge 
them in light of Christianity principles. The respondents of this study highlighted 
the responsibility to be honest in the business dealings, the duty to pay taxes 
correctly and treating each customer equally well. 
The Confucian religion also has an influence on management practices. For 
instance, Korean investment managers perceive it to be culturally inappropriate 
to challenge senior business leaders (IFC and Mercer 2009). The influence of 
Confucianism is an essential characteristic of Korean business as it was 
Korea‟s state religion for over 500 years (Solomon et al. 2002). The Confucian 
social system is hierarchical, which has been reflected in the structure of the 
chaebols where both ranking and seniority are preferred over meritocracy. 
These findings lead to the next hypothesis: 
 
                                                             
4 According to the Islamic principles (ASrIA 2003) 
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H8: The influence of religion affects the level of shareholder activism in the 
country. 
 
2.6.2.5. Practice of stock lending 
 
The increase in the practice of stock lending is another factor that may affect 
the level of shareholder activism. In stock lending, investors can borrow stocks 
from brokers and then sell them to the open market to later recover it by buying 
it back (Valdez 2007). 
In stock loans, the acquirers of the stocks are not always aware that, by buying 
them, they also acquire the voting rights of the shares (Myners 2004). 
Therefore, the wide use of this mechanism may curb investors‟ voting 
behaviour. 
 
H9: The higher the level of stock lending the lower the level of shareholder 
activism in the country. 
 
Clark and Hebb (2004) and Black (1992) propose that the level of portfolio 
turnover affects shareholder activism. Institutional investors that present more 
stable portfolios are more encouraged to engage with portfolio companies. On 
the other hand, investors that keep stocks for a shorter period favour the use of 
the exit strategy to enhance financial performance. 
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H10: The higher the stock turnover the lower the level of shareholder activism in 
the country. 
 
2.6.3. Organisational institutional factors 
 
Jackson (2009) considers that Institutional Theory tends to forget about the 
diversity within firms in the same environment. Oliver (1991) noted that 
organisations respond differently to institutional pressures according to its 
resource dependencies. Hence, it was found that not only international and 
domestic institutions influence the level of shareholder activism, but also the 
characteristics of the financial organisations that conduct or has the potential to 
conduct activism. The organisational institutions identified centre mainly on 
investor and portfolio characteristics. 
 
2.6.3.1. Investor characteristics 
 
According to the literature, the characteristics of the investor can encourage it to 
monitor its invested companies. Faccio and Lasfer (2000) argue that 
occupational pension funds that are managed internally are more likely to 
monitor their portfolio because they control the investment and the voting 
decisions. Secondly, public pension funds are also more likely to monitor than 
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private pension funds. Many private pension funds, sponsored by private 
companies, neither engage with companies to pressurise for improved 
performance nor encourage their fund managers to be activists. There is an 
implicit understanding among private pension funds that “each company‟s 
pension fund will refrain from an activist stance in return for a reciprocal stance 
from all others” (Monks and Sykes 2006, p. 232). The same is true for fund 
managers. If they develop an anti-manager reputation, they may find it harder to 
maintain or gain new projects (Black 1992). 
In addition, passive investors are also more likely to engage than active 
investors. Due to the indexed nature of their investment, exit is not an option 
(McLaren 2004). While investors that adopt an active investment strategy select 
the companies that they will invest, investors with a passive strategy rely on the 
portfolio selection of established financial indices. 
Moreover, companies that are universal owners are more likely to engage with 
their portfolio. Universal owners, by owning a small portion of almost every 
listed company in different industries, depend on the health of the overall 
economy to be profitable (Hawley and Williams 2006). Consequently, they are 
more likely to be concerned about long-term issues, such as sustainability, than 
the majority of investors, and more likely to engage. 
Private equity firms also have a high interest in engaging with the companies 
they invest, especially the ones that secure high returns through active post-
investment involvement in portfolio companies. Private equity firms are 
rewarded higher levels of return for a more intense and direct involvement with 
their invested companies. The involvement might include having a 
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representation on the board of directors, reviewing management accounts and 
board minutes and contributing in making decisions regarding strategic issues 
(Martin et al. 2007).   
 
H11a: The characteristics of the investor influence its likelihood to be an active 
shareholder. 
 
In terms of availability of financial resources impacting corporate practices, 
Aguilera et al. (2008) argue that large firms are more likely to have independent 
directors because they have the financial resources to comply with the 
requirements of board independence, while smaller firms have lower capacity to 
absorb these costs.  
Similarly, in the CSR field, larger companies are likely to be the agenda settlers 
as they have greater financial resources to devote to it (Chapple and Moon 
2005; Campbell 2007). This understanding is shared by the slack resources 
theorists who argue that the availability of financial resources allow companies 
to invest in philanthropic activities or in more long-term strategic impacts 
(Waddock and Graves 1997). 
The same can be concluded for shareholder activism. It is expected that the 
more resources investors have the more likely they will engage with their 
portfolio. 
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H11b: Larger investors have a stronger incentive to engage due to resource 
availability. 
 
2.6.3.2. Portfolio characteristics 
 
Clark and Hebb (2004) and Black (1992) propose that, when investors present 
a more diversified portfolio, they are less likely to engage with the invested 
companies because of the costs associated with it, including free rider costs. 
The benefits of promoting engagement with different companies are shared by 
other investors which did not participate in such expenditures. Contrarily, 
investors which have too large stakes in certain companies to exit are 
encouraged to engage as exit would result in share price erosion. 
 
H12: The level of diversification of the investor portfolio affects the level of 
shareholder activism of the investor. 
 
2.6.4. Strategic reasons 
 
Not only shareholder activism can be promoted by the influence of institutions, 
but also by the strategic decisions of the investors‟ management. This 
hypothesis draws on two theories: the Resource-Based View and rational 
Austrian economics. While the Resource-Based View can be applied to explain 
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that certain strategic actions are adopted with the aim to enhance competitive 
advantage, the Austrian perspective can explain the strategic actions that aim at 
benefiting from future opportunities. In the CSR arena, these theories helped 
explain why companies have an incentive to develop products with CSR 
characteristics (McWilliams and Siegel 2001; McWilliams et al. 2006; Baron 
2001) and why they invest in opportunities related to CSR that are envisaged to 
be profitable in the future (Frynas 2009). Through the lens of both theories, 
shareholder activism is not only determined by different institutional contexts, 
but also by the strategic choice of the investment players. Investors may employ 
shareholder activism as a strategy to enhance profitability of their invested 
companies (e.g. pressure companies for improved environmental management 
systems) and/or as a contingency plan so ensure that the invested companies 
will continue being profitable in the future (e.g.  lobby automotive firms to invest 
in hybrid cars). This leads to the final hypothesis: 
 
H13: Investors adopt shareholder activism to gain strategic advantage and to 
respond to entrepreneurial foresight. 
 
Summary of the chapter: This chapter offers a literature review surrounding 
the determinants of shareholder activism. Firstly, this chapter provided a brief 
description of institutional theory and discussed the structure of institutions in 
emerging markets.  Afterwards, the chapter analysed the literature on 
shareholder activism, particularly its definitions, main strategies, drivers and 
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obstacles and the state of activism in emerging markets. Further, the chapter 
reviewed the literature concerning institutional theory and corporate 
governance, and institutional theory and CSR.  Also, Austrian economics and 
the resource-based view were examined to analyse active strategic choice. 
Finally, hypotheses were developed concerning the determinants of 
shareholder activism. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction: This chapter will describe the methodological approach to be 
adopted in order to test the hypotheses developed in the literature review. It will 
lay out the ontological and epistemological approaches of this research, 
followed by the methods to be employed. This study will use mixed methods 
through the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. This chapter will also 
describe issues related to the evaluation of the research, ethics and timeframe. 
 
3.1. Ontological and epistemological approaches 
 
Before discussing the ontological and epistemological approaches of this 
research, it is noteworthy to define what ontology and epistemology are. While 
ontology is concerned with what exists to be investigated, epistemology refers 
to what can be regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Walliman 
2006). In other words, ontology refers to “philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of reality”, while epistemology consists of a “general set of assumptions 
about the best ways of inquiring into the nature of the world” (Easterby-Smith et 
al. 2008, p. 60). 
The philosophical approach of this research is based on critical realism, which 
is a relatively new epistemological approach that provides an alternative to 
positivism and relativism (McEvoy and Richards 2003; Robson 2002). Critical 
realists believe that the researcher can never fully gain a totally accurate picture 
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of the social world because of the possibility of distorted perception created by 
language, culture and experience (Houston 2001). In critical realism, the 
primary purpose of research is to obtain knowledge about underlying 
mechanisms or structures that explain how things actually work. Although such 
mechanisms cannot be directly observed, they can be identified through their 
effects (McEvoy and Richards 2003; Houston 2001). 
The critical realist approach is suitable for this type of research because the 
researcher is mainly interested in understanding the underlying mechanisms 
that influence the practice of shareholder activism. A constructionist ontology is 
considered unsuitable for this study as the researcher recognises that there is 
an external reality (realist ontology). A positivist epistemology would not be 
appropriate either as the researcher assumes that that reality cannot be 
captured in its entirety since the human observation is distorted by factors such 
as the perceptions of the researcher and participants as well as pre-conceptions 
to access reality. Therefore, critical realism is the most appropriate 
philosophical approach for this research. 
 
3.2. Methods employed 
 
Mixed methods will be used in this research, which combine quantitative and 
qualitative research (Bryman and Bell 2007). While qualitative research “uses 
an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter” (Denzin and Lincoln 
1994), quantitative research entails “a predilection for a natural science 
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approach and as having an objectivist conception of social reality” (Bryman and 
Bell 2007, p. 154). 
Creswell et al. (2008) offer five main types of mixed methods: (i) triangulation 
design, (ii) concurrent embedded design, (iii) explanatory design, (iv) 
exploratory design and (vi) sequential embedded design. The triangulation 
design entails the use of quantitative and qualitative methods concomitantly 
followed by the comparison of data for corroboration. This is the most popular 
design. In the concurrent embedded design, there is also the use of qualitative 
and quantitative methods to collect data simultaneously, and the methods may 
be used to address different research questions. Among the sequential types, 
the explanatory strategy implies the collection of quantitative data, followed by 
qualitative data, which helps to interpret the results of the former. The 
exploratory strategy employs qualitative data collection followed by quantitative 
collection, which builds on the results of the first phase. Finally, the sequential 
embedded design involves collecting qualitative data before and after the 
quantitative phase. The first qualitative data helps to improve the quantitative 
data collection and the second one helps to explain different outcomes.  
The model adopted for this research will be a combination of the concurrent 
embedded and the explanatory strategy designs. While quantitative methods 
will be employed prior to the qualitative research (as in the explanatory design), 
the methods will be used to address different questions (as in the concurrent 
embedded design). This study will start by analysing secondary data related to 
shareholder activism and institutions through correlation and regression 
analyses (quantitative methods). The second phase of the study consists of 
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investigating a set of case studies (qualitative methods) with the purpose of 
exploring whether the selected investors adopt activism practices as a source of 
competitive and differentiation advantage. 
Initially, the researcher considered the use of qualitative methods only, 
employing case studies and interviews with investors from emerging markets. 
However, she considered that the interviewees would not be able to identify and 
examine the extent to which institutions were influencing their activist behaviour. 
For instance, the ability of the investors to indicate that certain cultural 
characteristics of the country impact on their activist behaviour is limited as 
investors are embedded in the environment where the cultural features operate. 
On the other hand, the use of case studies can and will be used to examine the 
impact of strategy on shareholder activism. This can be examined through the 
accounts of the interviewees, who will be selected based on their responsibility 
to design or implement activism strategies. More details on the research phases 
are provided below. 
 
3.2.1. Quantitative phase 
 
This phase refers to the statistical analysis that associates shareholder activism 
and institutions. This section will describe the countries selected for the study, 
the data collected and the data analysis procedures. 
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3.2.1.1. Sampling 
 
The sampling technique used in this research is the purposive sampling, which 
chooses participants based on their unique characteristics (Cooper and 
Schindler 2006). This type of sampling is particularly suitable for studying issues 
that are too rare to be studied through probability sampling (Gray et al. 2007), 
which is the case of shareholder activism. The researcher will focus on the 
emerging markets that present practices of activism as shown at the PRI‟s 
database. Such database refers to the results of the survey that the PRI 
conducts annually with its signatories to assess to what extent they are 
incorporating the Principles of Responsible Investment. Access to this data is 
currently being negotiated between the researcher and the organisation. 
 
3.2.1.2. Quantitative data collection 
 
As this phase aims at identifying the institutional influences that affect 
shareholder activism, the variables to be adopted refer to shareholder activism 
practices (dependent variables) and institutions (independent variables). 
In terms of data related to shareholder activism, this study will make use of the 
PRI survey results (PRI 2010b). The statistics concerning shareholder activism 
will be measured through (i) level of votes cast; (ii) total number of filing and co-
filing of shareholder resolutions and (iiI) level of engagement activities. 
According to the PRI (2010b), the level of votes cast correspond to the average 
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percentage of the country in relation to (i) number of ballot items voted, (ii) 
number of meetings voted and (iii) sum of assets on meeting record dates for 
which votes were cast. Secondly, the number of filing and co-filing of 
shareholder resolutions relates to the total number of ESG shareholder 
resolutions filed as lead filer and as co-filer. Thirdly, the level of engagement 
activities consists of (i) the total number of extensive engagement conducted in 
the country in the period analysed, (ii) the number of moderate engagement and 
(iii) the total number of basic engagement. While extensive engagement has a 
systematic approach and a clear goal, moderate engagement is less systematic 
and basic engagement is ad hoc and reactive. 
As for the independent variables that measure institutions, these are shown in 
the table below.  
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Table 3-1 – Independent variables 
 
 
Nature of 
institution 
Concept Indicator 
Hypothesis 
to test 
International 
Level of 
international 
capital inflows 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows (UNCTAD 
2009) 
H1 
International 
Consulting 
services 
Percentage of the top 10 consulting firms that 
have offices in the country (data retrieved from 
websites of consulting firms) 
H2 
International Academia 
Number of managers sent to study in Anglo-
American countries (source to be confirmed) 
H3 
International 
International 
regulations 
Number of PRI signatories (PRI 2010a) H4 
Domestic Legal framework 
 Legal origin of the company law (Reynolds 
and Flores 1989 cited in La Porta et al. 
1998)  
 Existence of one share-one vote rule (La 
Porta et al. 1998) 
 Proxy by mail allowed (La Porta et al. 
1998) 
 Shares not blocked before the meeting (La 
Porta et al. 1998) 
 Cumulative voting allowed (La Porta et al. 
1998) 
 Oppressed minority (whether minority 
shareholders have judicial rights to 
challenge the decisions of management) 
(La Porta et al. 1998) 
 Preemptive right to new issues (La Porta 
et al. 1998) 
 Percentage of income companies must 
distribute among ordinary shareholders (La 
Porta et al. 1998) 
H5a 
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A more detailed account of the variables selected is found in Appendix 3. 
 
Nature of 
institution 
Concept Indicator 
Hypothesis 
to test 
 
Domestic 
Judicial 
enforcement 
 Efficiency of the judicial system Index 
(Business International Corp adapted by 
La Porta et al. 1998) 
 Rule of law index;  (International Country 
Risk Guide adapted by La Porta et al. 
1998) 
 Corruption index (International Country 
Risk Guide adapted by La Porta et al. 
1998) 
 Risk of expropriation index (International 
Country Risk Guide adapted by La Porta et 
al. 1998) 
 Likelihood of contract repudiation by the 
government index (International Country 
Risk Guide adapted by La Porta et al. 
1998) 
H5b 
Domestic 
Non-governmental 
enforcement 
Civil society index (BTI 2009) H5c 
Domestic 
Share 
concentration 
% share ownership in the hands of majority 
shareholders (National Statistics from the 
countries investigated) 
H6 
Domestic National culture 
Cultural dimensions: 
 Power distance 
 Uncertainty avoidance 
 Long-term orientation 
 Masculinity 
 Individuality (Hofstede 1980) 
H7 
Domestic Religion 
% of followers of main religions (National 
Statistics from the countries investigated) 
H8 
Domestic Stock lending 
Amount of assets in custody (National 
Statistics of the countries surveyed) 
H9 
Domestic Portfolio turnover Turnover ratio (World Bank 2008) H10 
Organisational Investor type Type of investor (PRI 2010b) H11a 
Organisational 
Nature of 
investment 
% of passive and active investment in relation 
to the total  (PRI 2010b) 
H11a 
Organisational Size of investor Total assets under management  (PRI 2010b) H11b 
Organisational 
Portfolio 
diversification 
% of assets under management (per asset) 
(PRI 2010b) 
H12 
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3.2.1.3. Quantitative data analysis 
 
The data described above will be analysed using SPSS. To analyse which 
institutional variables are helpful in predicting the level of shareholder activism 
in the country, international, domestic and organisational institutions indicators 
will be used as independent or explanatory variables and indicators related to 
shareholder activism will be used as dependent or response variables. 
Before running regression analysis, the variables that present unequally 
scattered spread will be logistically transformed so as to make the distribution of 
the variable more symmetric and to make the relationship more linear.  
Secondly, the independent variables will be tested to identify the presence of 
eventual multicollinearity. This refers to the existence of high correlation 
between independent variables. The existence of multicollinearity makes the 
interpretation of coefficients difficult because it depresses the significance of the 
affected variables (Husted and Allen 2007). In case there is multicollinearity, 
single regression will be performed for each of the predictor variables in relation 
to activism practices. If there is no multicollinearity, the independent variables 
will be regressed through multiple linear regression (Jarett 2006). 
To sum, in this phase, the researcher will collect data from secondary sources 
from the emerging countries selected and will conduct regression analysis so as 
to establish to what extent the institutions analysed have an impact on 
shareholder activism in the emerging markets. 
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3.2.2. Case study research 
 
This phase aims at identifying whether shareholder activism is used as a source 
of competitive advantage and strategic choice in the emerging markets, as 
posited by the Resource-Based View and the Austrian perspectives. The 
researcher will adopt case study research, which consists of a detailed 
investigation of phenomena within their context with the aim to offer an 
investigation of the context and processes that clarify the theories being 
researched (Hartley 2004).  
Case studies can be used to accomplish several aims: to provide description, to 
test theory and to generate theory (Einsenhardt 1989). For this study, case 
study will be used to test theory. A number of investors from emerging markets 
will be interviewed so as to explore to what extent shareholder activism is 
determined by strategic choice.  
 
3.2.2.1. Sampling 
 
The sample will be composed by a sample of five investors from the emerging 
markets. The organisations will not be selected based on random sampling, but 
as whether they provide examples of polar types (Einsenhardt 1989) or critical 
cases (Bryman and Bell 2007). Due to the reduced number of cases that can be 
studied, it makes sense to choose extreme situations in which the process of 
interest is more transparently observable (Pettigrew 1988). The respondents 
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selected will be chosen based on (i) recognition of these organisations as 
leaders in shareholder activities in emerging markets5; and (ii) additionally, 
universal owners will be preferred because, as they depend on the health of the 
overall economy to be profitable (Hawley and Williams 2006), they are more 
likely to be concerned about long-term issues. It is expected that leading 
investors with the characteristics mentioned above will be more driven by 
competitive motivations than other investors (cf. Frynas 2009). 
The participants will be contacted by e-mail, followed by a telephone call, to ask 
for their participation in the research. The researcher will provide the 
participants with a cover letter offering detailed information of the research 
project, including (i) aims and goals of the research; (ii) study‟s usefulness; (iii) 
explanation of why the respondent was selected and importance of their 
response; (iv) guarantee of confidentiality and anonymity; (v) offer to make the 
results available and (vi) contact details for queries (cf. De Vaus 2004; Neuman 
2006; Sarantakos 2005 in Creswell 2009; Gray et al. 2007). By providing this 
cover letter, the researcher aims at guaranteeing that the participants are fully 
informed about the research and consent to participate on a voluntary basis. 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 IFC’s reports can serve as references, such as Mercer and IFC (2009), which cite ABN Amro, 
HSBC and Rio Bravo as the highest ESG rated fund managers in Brazil and Rexiter, RCM and 
Samsung Investment Trust in South Korea. The PRI representatives will also be contacted to 
suggest interviewees. 
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3.2.2.2. Data collection 
 
Data collection will be achieved through semi-structured interviews. The 
interviewee will be responsible for the engagement activities within the 
investment firm (e.g. ESG specialist, analyst, portfolio manager). Whenever 
possible, more than one member of the targeted organisation will be 
interviewed. Furthermore, preference will be given to personal interviews. This 
is to ensure that the participant feels more comfortable with the interview and 
builds rapport with the interviewer (Cooper and Schindler 2006). The researcher 
will also apply for travel research grants to facilitate personal encounters. 
Alternatively, interviewees will be contacted by phone or Skype6 so as not to 
lose interviewee participation due to geographical constraints (Cooper and 
Schindler 2006). All interviews will be transcribed and translated for further 
analysis. 
The researcher will strive to interview the participants in their own language. 
This will be possible in some countries, as the researcher speaks English, 
Portuguese and French fluently. However, in case this is not feasible, the 
researcher will employ a translator to facilitate the interviews. Access to the 
interviewees will be facilitated by the PRI and by the researcher‟s professional 
network. 
Semi-structure interviews were the chosen method because it allows cross-
case comparability, in contrast with unstructured interviews (Bryman and Bell 
2007). Besides, the interview guide helps the researcher to investigate a fairly 
                                                             
6 A software application that allows users to make voice calls over the Internet. 
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clear focus, but also gives flexibility to accommodate other areas of interest 
found during the interview (Bryman and Bell 2007). In addition, one-to-one 
interviews have the advantage of accommodating the investors‟ busy 
schedules. Also, the acceptability of participating in interviews is higher than for 
other methods because of the familiarity with this method and the fact that 
people generally enjoy speaking about their work (King 2006). 
As for the disadvantages of interviews, interviews are resource, time and 
energy consuming (Robson 2002). What‟s more, interviews can generate a data 
overload that might compromise the researcher‟s ability to analyse it. 
Furthermore, the researcher relies on the participants‟ perceptions instead of 
what effectively happened. In order to deal with these limitations, NVivo will be 
adopted to analyse data and the data will be triangulated with documentary 
analysis, as described below.  
The investors‟ annual reports, CSR reports, responsible investment policies and 
corporate websites will be examined to search for the motivations that drive 
these companies to practice shareholder activism, with focus on the drivers 
related to strategic intent. Statements that demonstrate that the investor is 
interested in using shareholder activism as a source of competitive advantage 
may mention, for instance, the improved financial performance derived from it 
(e.g. USS 20107; Cazenove 20088). 
 
                                                             
7 “USS endeavours to identify risks and opportunities at an early stage to minimise loss and 
maximise returns for the fund” (USS 2010). 
8 “We take an active interest in promoting best corporate governance practice among the 
companies in which we invest as we believe this will be beneficial to their performance and 
to the long term financial interest of the clients on whose behalf we act” (Cazenove 2008). 
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3.2.2.3. Data analysis 
 
Thematic analysis will be used as the method for data analysis as it offers a 
flexible tool to analyse qualitative data in a rich, detailed and complex manner. 
Another advantage of this analytical approach relates to the fact that it is not 
wedded to any theoretical framework and can be used within different 
philosophical approaches (Braun and Clarke 2006). Other types of qualitative 
data analysis techniques were considered for this study. However, techniques 
such as Conversational Analysis is not appropriate because the researcher is 
more interested in the actual content of the interviews in contrast to capturing 
subtle details from the data collected (Samra-Fredericks 2004). Discourse 
Analysis is not suitable either as this study does not aim at investigating the 
underlying aims of the accounts of the participants or the context in which the 
statement were made (Dick 2004). 
 
3.3. Research evaluation 
 
This research will be evaluated based on four criteria: internal validity, construct 
validity, reliability and external validity. This is to ensure the quality of the 
research and to guarantee that steps are employed to enhance the validity and 
reliability of the research whenever necessary. 
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3.3.1. Quantitative research evaluation 
 
Construct validity relates to whether a measure of a concept really reflects the 
concept being studied (Bryman and Bell 2007). For the statistical analysis, all 
indicators used in this study were analysed to check whether they correspond to 
the concepts being studied. Such analysis is found in Appendix 3. 
In quantitative research, internal validity accounts for the establishment of a 
causal relationship in which certain conditions lead to other conditions (Bryman 
and Bell 2007). Internal validity will be achieved by assuring that the regression 
analyses are performed correctly. This will be accomplished by checking for 
multicollinearity between independent variables and by checking whether the 
indicators used are unequally scattered (presence of heteroscedascity), as 
previously mentioned. 
Reliability is concerned with the question of whether the results of a study are 
repeatable and the study can be replicated (Bryman and Bell 2007). Reliability 
will be assured by selecting the most appropriate methods for analysing the 
data and by carefully documenting all the steps of the analysis to guarantee 
future replicability or auditing. Moreover, the methods employed to construct 
each of the indicators used in this study were analysed to check whether they 
are reliable (as in Appendix 3). 
External validity or generalisability refers to the degree to which findings can be 
generalised (Bryman and Bell 2007). External validity will be achieved by the 
use of an extensive number of countries (from the PRI‟s database). By 
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analysing the determinants of shareholder activism in relation to a large number 
of countries, a higher degree of generalisability is reached. 
 
3.3.2. Qualitative research evaluation 
 
In the case studies, construct validity will be reached by using multiple sources 
of evidence (or data triangulation), establishing of a chain of evidence and 
participant validation. Data triangulation will be conducted by using both 
documentary analysis and the interview accounts to confirm the findings. 
Moreover, more than one member of each of the targeted organisations will be 
interviewed, whenever feasible, so as to compare their different perceptions 
towards the same subject. To establish a chain of evidence, the researcher will 
make use of the case study protocol and the case study database to document 
how the research was carried out, providing an evidentiary track. Participant 
validation will be gathered by submitting the findings of the interviews to the 
interviewees to cross-check the participants‟ perceptions with the researcher‟s 
tentative findings (Yin 2003; Bryman and Bell 2007; Robson 2002). 
In qualitative analysis, internal validity concerns the match between 
observations and theoretical ideas (Bryman and Bell 2007). To enhance internal 
validity, the researcher will aim at establishing a good and trust-based 
relationship with the participant so as to avoid respondent bias. Triangulation, 
participant validation and audit trail will also contribute to enhanced internal 
validity. In order to avoid researcher bias, peer debriefing will be used. The 
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researcher will search for support from her colleagues by meeting regularly 
some of the PhD students and discussing the progress and findings of the 
research, along with theirs, in search for possible bias that her background and 
preconceptions might bring to the research.  
Reliability will be reached though the development of case study protocols and 
a case study database, as suggested by Yin (2003). A case study protocol 
provides details of each case study, including the overview of the project, field 
procedures, case study questions and a guide for the case study report. The 
case study database records all the different types of data that were collected 
and produced during the research, such as notes, documents, tabular materials 
and narratives. The case study protocol will be developed in the beginning of 
this study according to Yin‟s (2003) content suggestion so as to prepare the 
researcher for the research process and for possible contingencies. To compile 
a case study database, the research will use NVivo, which is a helpful tool to 
catalogue raw data, such as the interview transcriptions, interview notes, 
recordings of the interviews and eventual documents used. 
External validity represents a problem for case study researchers as the sample 
adopted is usually small (Bryman and Bell 2007). However, since the aim of 
case study research is to contribute to existing and new theories and capture 
findings in their uniqueness (Hammersley and Gomm 2000), this research will 
seek to achieve a degree of theoretical generalisability from the cases studied 
(Bryman and Bell 2007) by analysing whether the search for competitive 
advantage is a driver for leading investors to conduct shareholder activism. 
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3.4. Ethics 
 
Ethical issues represent the concerns and dilemmas that arise over the proper 
way to conduct research (Neuman 2006). This research will comply with the 
School Research Committee Ethics Panel‟s Guidelines on Research Ethics and 
will assess its impacts on (i) harm to participants, (ii) informed consent; (iii) 
confidentiality and anonymity issues and (iv) voluntary participation, explained 
below. 
 
3.4.1. Harm to participants 
 
In general, social research can harm a research participant through physical 
harm, psychological harm, legal harm, and harm to a person‟s career or income 
(Neuman 2006). This research will not involve threats to physical harm as the 
main data collection methods will consist of document analysis and interviews. 
However, as mental stress could be a result of the interview process, the 
researcher will aim at overcoming it by offering the participants guarantee of 
anonymity and confidentiality in the study, interviewing the participants in a 
silent and private environment and, whenever feasible, interview the 
participants in their own environment and in their own language. Legal and 
career harm are not relevant in this study as informed consent will be asked and 
confidentiality and anonymity will be guaranteed. 
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3.4.2. Respondent’s informed consent 
 
The researcher will not request written consent, as, according to Cooper and 
Schindler (2006), oral consent is sufficient in most business research.  
To gain respondent‟s informed consent, all the participants will be provided with 
a cover letter when receiving the survey so as to offer all necessary information 
regarding the research. The goal is to offer sufficient information so that the 
participants can make a conscious decision about their participation in the 
research. 
 
3.4.3. Confidentiality and anonymity 
 
Creswell (2009) and Neuman (2006) do not agree on the definitions on 
confidentiality and anonymity. Creswell (2009) states that while confidentiality 
refers to the non-disclosure of the identity of the participants, anonymity refers 
to the impossibility of relating the research findings with the respondents. 
Neuman (2006) defines these concepts differently. He posits that, while 
anonymity means that people remain nameless, confidentiality is the 
impossibility to relate the identity of the individuals to the information. 
Independently of the definition adopted, anonymity and confidentiality will be 
maintained by not disclosing the names of the participants at any point and by 
not publishing single accounts in case there is possibility of identifying the 
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participant. Moreover, the fact that data collection will not involve group 
interviews or focus groups will help preserving privacy issues. 
 
3.4.4. Voluntary participation 
 
In terms of voluntary participation, the cover letter will make it explicit that 
participants will be free to withdraw from the research at any point that they 
consider adequate and that they will be free to refuse answering certain 
questions on whatever grounds they feel are justified. This will be reinforced at 
the beginning of each interview. 
 
3.5. Timeline 
 
The timeline for this research is shown in the table below. 
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Table 3-2 - Timeline 
 
Summary of the chapter: This chapter described the methodological approach 
which will be adopted in this research. A critical realist epistemology is the 
philosophical approach used. The method employed to test the hypotheses 
developed in the literature review is mixed and will comprise two phases: one 
quantitative and another qualitative.  The first phase will analyse statistically the 
institutional determinants of shareholder activism and the second phase will 
examine, through case studies, the existence of strategic drivers for conducting 
activism. This research will be evaluated according to internal, construct and 
external validity and reliability. 
 
  
Tasks Period for completion 
Literature review Second semester 2010 
Methodology Second semester 2010 
Data collection - quantitative First semester 2011 
Data analysis - quantitative First semester 2011 
Interviews with fund managers Second semester 2011 
Analysis of interviews Second semester 2011 and first 
semester 2012 
Overall analysis Second semester 2012 
Writing-up 2013 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
The main purpose of this study is to analyse the factors that influence 
shareholder activism in emerging markets base on Institutional Theory, 
Resource-Based View and Austrian economics. It is expected that the results of 
this study will lead to the development of a framework that systematically 
analyses the determinants of shareholder activism. 
This research will have both academic and practical benefits. Academically, this 
research will develop the literature on shareholder activism in emerging 
markets. This study will also be of interest to institutionalists, RVB academics 
and Austrian economics as these theories prove to be effective to analyse 
shareholder activism. Practically, this research aims at helping investors to 
design global shareholder activism strategies by identifying the factors that 
enhance or curb activism in emerging markets.  
This dissertation reviewed the main literature concerning the topic under study, 
developed a set of hypotheses concerning the influential factors shareholder 
activism and developed a methodological approach for investigation. 
The literature review covered the literature on institutions, shareholder activism, 
institutional determinants of corporate governance and CSR and studies 
relating CSR to RBV and Austrian economics. Further, it developed a series of 
hypotheses concerning the determinants of shareholder activism in emerging 
markets. 
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The literature review demonstrated that there is a lack of literature concerning 
shareholder activism in emerging markets and concerning a more systematic 
analysis of the institutional factors. Moreover, this literature identified other gaps 
than the ones that this research will tackle. The analysis of the institutional 
determinants of corporate governance has focused mostly on the contrast 
between the Liberal and the Coordinated Economies, with considerable less 
number of studies centred on other countries. In addition, the institutional 
literature on CSR is more restricted than the one in corporate governance and 
studies on the developing countries is practically non-existent. Furthermore, 
while the use of the Resource-Based View has been adopted when discussing 
strategic CSR, the Austrian perspective is less employed. All these identified 
gaps can be tackled as future avenues of research. 
The epistemological approach that will be adopted in this study is represented 
by critical realism and the methods employed are mixed. Firstly, quantitative 
analysis will be utilised to associate institutional determinants and shareholder 
activism practices. Secondly, case study research will be used to identify to 
what extent active strategic choice explain the adoption of shareholder activism. 
Some limitations of this research should be highlighted. First of all, although the 
researcher is in negotiation with the PRI to gain access to its data and that the 
organisation is positive towards my research, there is a possibility that the PRI 
will decide to withdraw its support. In case this happens, the researcher will 
conduct a survey with the PRI signatories from emerging markets.  
Secondly, considering that the researcher is interested in interviewing the 
critical cases, the success of the research depends on the fairly restricted 
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amount of cases. To deal with this limitation, the researcher will make use of 
her professional networking, gained during her previous work experience in 
Brazil and in the UK. 
The third limitation refers to the lack of generalisability derived from the case 
studies. However, as the topic of this research is not well researched, this study 
will acquire a more exploratory feature. Hence, the aim is to acquire a higher 
degree of theoretical generalisation instead of one of statistical generalisation. 
This dissertation will serve as the building block for my doctoral project which, 
as stated in the timeframe, is expected to be completed in three years. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
Studies concerning the relationship between shareholder activism and 
financial performance 
 
Study Title Findings 
Relationship shareholder 
activism-financial 
performance 
Bizjak and Marquette 
(1998) 
Are shareholders all bark 
and no bite? Evidence from 
shareholder resolutions to 
rescind poison pills 
Managers are more likely 
to restructure a pill 
following a shareholder 
proposal and restructurings 
are associated with positive 
stock price reaction. 
POSITIVE 
Core, et al. 
 (2006) 
Does weak governance 
cause weak stock returns? 
An examination of firm 
operating performance and 
investors‟ expectations. 
Results do not support 
hypothesis that weak 
governance causes poor 
stock returns 
NEUTRAL 
Del Guercio and Hawkins 
----(1999) 
The motivation and impact 
of pension fund 
activism 
Found no significant effects 
of shareholder proposals 
on stock return in the 3 
years following initial target 
and sketchy evidence of 
positive effects in the short 
term. 
NEUTRAL 
Faccio and Lasfer (2000) 
Do occupational pension 
funds monitor companies in 
which they hold large 
stakes? 
Holding large stakes of 
listed companies does not 
lead companies to 
outperform their industry 
counterparts 
NEUTRAL 
Gillan and Starks (2000) 
Relationship investing and 
shareholder activism by 
institutional investors 
Proposals sponsored by 
institutional investors have 
a small negative impact on 
stock prices 
NEGATIVE 
Gompers et al. 
 (2003) 
Corporate governance and 
equity prices. 
Firms with stronger 
shareholder rights had 
higher profits 
POSITIVE 
Karpoff et al. (1996) 
Corporate governance and 
shareholder initiatives: 
empirical evidence 
Governance proposals 
have little effect on 
company share value 
NEUTRAL 
Opler and Sokobin (1995) 
Does coordinated 
institutional activism 
Coordinated shareholder 
activism increases 
POSITIVE 
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Study Title Findings 
Relationship shareholder 
activism-financial 
performance 
work? An analysis of the 
activities of the 
Council of Institutional 
Investors. 
shareholder value 
Smith (1996) 
Shareholder activism by 
institutional 
investors: Evidence from 
CalPERS. 
Successful shareholder 
activism results in 
significant increase in 
shareholder wealth 
POSITIVE 
Strickland et al. (1996) 
A requiem for the USA 
Is small shareholder 
monitoring effective? 
United Shareholder 
Association (USA)-
sponsored shareholder 
activism enhanced 
shareholder value 
POSITIVE 
Wahal (1996) 
Pension fund activism and 
firm performance 
There is no evidence of 
significant long-term 
improvement in stock price 
in the post-targeting period 
NEUTRAL 
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Appendix 2 
Relationship between cultural factors and key social issues (Katz et al. 
2001, p. 156-7) 
 
Social issue CFI scores 
Power 
distance 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Individualism Masculinity 
Consumers 
High 
Opinion of 
friends and 
relatives more 
important 
Less tolerance 
for consumer 
political activity 
More consumer 
advocacy 
More emphasis 
on money 
Low 
More reliance 
on outside 
opinion 
More 
acceptance of 
consumer 
political activity 
Less consumer 
advocacy 
More emphasis 
on people 
Environment 
High 
Less concern 
for 
environmental 
protection 
More 
environmental 
legislation 
A focus on 
profit-seeking 
and wealth 
accumulation 
tempered by a 
concern for 
broad social 
welfare 
Economic 
growth takes 
precedence 
Low 
More concern 
for 
environmental 
protection 
Less 
environmental 
legislation 
More focus on 
family and local 
community 
welfare 
Conservation 
important 
Employees 
High 
More emphasis 
on rigid 
hierarchy and 
unequal 
standing 
Employee 
complicity 
stressed 
Employee 
personal time 
more important 
Greater 
emphasis on 
salary and 
public 
recognition 
Low 
More emphasis 
on equality and 
rewarding 
“legitimate 
power” 
More employee 
conflict allowed 
Employee 
involvement 
with the 
company more 
important 
Focus on 
cooperation 
Government 
involvement 
in society 
High 
Greater 
centralisation of 
power that 
favours the 
wealthy and the 
military 
Greater 
adherence to 
formal 
structures and 
written rules 
regarding 
social issues 
Tendency for a 
balance of 
power between 
government 
and the 
business sector 
Less public 
welfare funding 
Low 
More 
decentralised 
power and 
redistribution of 
wealth 
More emphasis 
on organisation 
and settlement 
regarding 
social issues 
Greater relative 
power of 
government 
More public 
welfare funding 
The role of 
business in 
High 
Greater 
protection of 
Business tend 
to obey 
More profit-
oriented with a 
More profit-
oriented 
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Social issue CFI scores 
Power 
distance 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
Individualism Masculinity 
community 
affairs 
prerogatives of 
elites 
authorities propensity to 
inform the 
public about 
corporate 
policies 
low 
More concern 
for interacting 
with the public 
Business is 
more 
concerned with 
expectations of 
the public 
More 
collectivism 
with less 
emphasis on 
business 
informing the 
public about 
corporate social 
policies 
More service-
oriented with 
sympathy for 
the unfortunate 
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Appendix 3 
Analysis of validity and reliability of the indicators employed 
 
Indicator Analysis of validity Analysis of reliability 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
inflows (UNCTAD 
2009) 
Proxy measure of the level of 
international influence, represented 
by the level of investment that enter 
the country 
FDI inflows refer to capital provided 
by a foreign direct investor to a FDI 
enterprise. It includes equity 
capital, reinvested earnings and 
intra-company loans. 
 Equity capital is the foreign 
direct investor's purchase of 
shares of an enterprise in a 
country other than that of its 
residence. 
 Reinvested earnings comprise 
the direct investor's share (in 
proportion to direct equity 
participation) of earnings not 
distributed as dividends by 
affiliates or earnings not 
remitted to the direct investor. 
Such retained profits by 
affiliates are reinvested. 
 Intra-company loans or intra-
company debt transactions 
refer to short- or long-term 
borrowing and lending of funds 
between direct investors 
(parent enterprises) and 
affiliate enterprises. 
Percentage of the 
top 10 consulting 
firms that have 
offices in the 
country 
Direct measure of the presence of 
the top consulting firms in the 
countries surveyed 
This measure will be constructed 
through calculating the percentage 
of 10 top consulting firms that are 
present in the countries under 
study. 
Number of 
managers sent to 
study in Anglo-
American 
countries 
Source to be confirmed Source to be confirmed 
Number of PRI 
signatories (PRI 
2010a) 
Proxy measure of the level of non-
governmental regulation promoting 
shareholder activism, represented by 
The indicator is reliable because 
the PRI, who is responsible for 
publishing this measure, has a 
precise account of the number of 
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Indicator Analysis of validity Analysis of reliability 
the level of PRI signatories. PRI signatories in each country. 
 
Legal origin of 
the company law 
(Reynolds and 
Flores 1989 cited 
in La Porta et al. 
1998) 
The indicator is a direct measure of 
the nature of the legal system. 
This classification is from Reynolds 
and Flores (1989) and considered 
uncontroversial among legal 
scholars. There is the civil law legal 
tradition, which is divided into 
French, German and Scandinavian, 
and the common law family. 
One share-one 
vote rule  (La 
Porta et al 1998) 
Measures the level of legal investor 
protection represented by whether 
ordinary shares carry one vote per 
share. 
Data is reliable as it is directly 
retrieved from the country‟s 
company law or commercial code. 
Proxy by mail 
allowed (La Porta 
et al 1998) 
Measures the level of legal investor 
protection represented by whether 
investors are allowed to mail their 
proxy votes to the firms. 
Data is reliable as it is directly 
retrieved from the country‟s 
company law or commercial code. 
Shares not 
blocked before 
the meeting (La 
Porta et al 1998) 
Measures the level of legal investor 
protection represented by whether 
investors are required to deposit their 
shares prior to AGMs. 
Data is reliable as it is directly 
retrieved from the country‟s 
company law or commercial code. 
Cumulative 
voting allowed 
(La Porta et al 
1998) 
Measures the level of legal investor 
protection represented by whether 
investors are allowed to cast all their 
votes for one candidate only for the 
board of directors. 
Data is reliable as it is directly 
retrieved from the country‟s 
company law or commercial code. 
Oppressed 
minority (La Porta 
et al 1998) 
Measures the level of legal investor 
protection represented by a direct 
measure of whether minority 
shareholders (own 10% of shares or 
less) have judicial rights to challenge 
the decisions of management. 
Data is reliable as it is directly 
retrieved from the country‟s 
company law or commercial code. 
Preemptive right 
to new issues (La 
Porta et al 1998) 
Measures the level of legal investor 
protection represented by whether 
investors have first opportunity to 
buy new issues of stock to keep the 
same proportion of ownership. 
Data is reliable as it is directly 
retrieved from the country‟s 
company law or commercial code. 
Mandatory 
dividend (La 
Porta et al 1998) 
Measures the level of legal investor 
protection represented by the 
percentage of income companies 
must distribute among ordinary 
shareholders. 
Data is reliable as it is directly 
retrieved from the country‟s 
company law or commercial code. 
Efficiency of the 
judicial system 
(Business 
Proxy measure of the level of 
enforcement towards investor 
protection regulations represented by 
La Porta et al. (1998) used and 
adapted this data from the 
Business International Corporation, 
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Indicator Analysis of validity Analysis of reliability 
International 
Corporation 
adapted by La 
Porta et al 1998) 
 
the level of efficiency of the legal 
environment affecting foreign firms. 
which does not publish the 
technical aspects of measurement. 
Rule of law 
(International 
Country Risk 
Guide adapted by 
La Porta et al 
1998) 
Proxy measure of the level of 
enforcement towards investor 
protection regulations represented by 
the level of law and order tradition of 
the country. 
La Porta et al. (1998) used and 
adapted this data from the 
International Country Risk Guide, 
which does not publish the 
technical aspects of measurement. 
Corruption 
(International 
Country Risk 
Guide adapted by 
La Porta et al 
1998) 
Proxy measure of the level of 
enforcement towards investor 
protection regulations represented by 
the level of corruption within the 
political system. 
La Porta et al. (1998) used and 
adapted this data from the 
International Country Risk Guide, 
which does not publish the 
technical aspects of measurement. 
Risk of 
expropriation 
(International 
Country Risk 
Guide adapted by 
La Porta et al 
1998) 
Proxy measure of the level of 
enforcement towards investor 
protection regulations represented by 
the risk of confiscation or forced 
nationalisation. 
La Porta et al. (1998) used and 
adapted this data from the 
International Country Risk Guide, 
which does not publish the 
technical aspects of measurement. 
Likelihood of 
contract 
repudiation by 
the government 
(International 
Country Risk 
Guide adapted by 
La Porta et al 
1998) 
Proxy measure of the level of 
enforcement towards investor 
protection regulations represented by 
the measure of the risk of change in 
contract due to budget cutbacks, 
change in government or other. 
La Porta et al. (1998) used and 
adapted this data from the 
International Country Risk Guide, 
which does not publish the 
technical aspects of measurement. 
BTI‟s Civil society 
indicator 
Proxy indicator that measures the 
long-term presence of public or civic 
engagement, numerous and active 
NGOs, trust in institutions, social 
trust, and a civic culture of moderate 
participation (i.e., neither excessive 
nor nonexistent) in public life 
The measure is compiled based on 
the responses of the country 
experts in relation to what extent 
they consider that there are 
traditions of civil society in the 
country. Two country experts and 
the regional coordinators review the 
indicators so as the calibrate 
responses. 
% share 
ownership in the 
hands of majority 
shareholders 
Direct measure of the ratio of 
majority shareholders in relation to 
the total assets under management 
in the country. 
Measurement depends on the 
methodology employed in each 
country. 
84 
 
Indicator Analysis of validity Analysis of reliability 
(National 
Statistics) 
Hofstede (1980) 
 Power 
distance 
 Uncertainty 
avoidance 
 Long-term 
orientation 
 Masculinity 
 Individuality 
Indicators represent the differences 
in national culture in each culture. 
The measurement was compiled 
based on a worldwide survey 
conducted with IBM subsidiaries. 
The reliability of the indicator is 
partly compromised because the 
use of a sample composed by 
IBM‟s employees to generalise to 
the whole country can be biased. 
However, the indicator is widely 
used in the academic literature. 
% of followers of 
main religions 
(National 
Statistics) 
Proxy measure of the level of 
influence of each religion in the 
country. 
Measurement depends on the 
methodology employed in each 
country. 
Amount of assets 
in custody 
(National 
Statistics) 
Direct measure of the total amount of 
assets that were lent in a given year. 
Measurement depends on the 
methodology employed in each 
country. 
Turnover ratio of 
stocks traded 
(World Bank 
2008) 
Proxy measure of the level of short-
termism of investment in the country. 
The measure represents the total 
value of shares traded during the 
period divided by the average 
market capitalization for the period. 
The data is retrieved from Standard 
& Poor's, Emerging Stock Markets 
Factbook and supplemental S&P 
data. 
Type of investor 
(question 2 of the 
PRI 
questionnaire) 
Direct measure of percentage of 
investors per category 
The measure is reliable as data is 
directly retrieved from the PRI 
signatories. Asset owners are 
divided into (i) non-corporate 
pension or superannuation or 
retirement or provident fund or 
plan; (ii) corporate pension or 
superannuation or retirement or 
provident fund or plan; (iii) 
insurance company; (iv) foundation 
or endowment; (v) development 
bank; (vi) reserve (sovereign or 
government controlled fund. 
Investment managers are divided 
into: (i) primarily invest directly in 
companies and other asset 
classes, not via funds; (ii) primarily 
perform investment research 
internally and provide list of eligible 
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Indicator Analysis of validity Analysis of reliability 
securities (or ineligible securities) to 
sub-advisors; (iii) primarily provide 
manager of managers, fund of 
funds or sub-advised products or 
investment strategies. 
Size of investor 
(question 7 of the 
PRI 
questionnaire) 
Level of total assets under 
management per signatory 
Measured by assets under 
management of all the consolidated 
subsidiaries as of 31 December 
2009. The measure is reliable as it 
is directly retrieved from the PRI 
signatories. 
Nature of 
investment 
(question 8 of the 
PRI 
questionnaire) 
Level of investment managed 
passively and level of investment 
managed actively, per signatory 
The measure is reliable as data is 
directly retrieved from the PRI 
signatories. Passive and active 
investment are divided into 
internally and externally managed. 
Type of 
investment 
(question 8 of the 
PRI 
questionnaire) 
Percentage of each type of invest 
asset class, per signatory 
The measure is reliable as data is 
directly retrieved from the PRI 
signatories. Asset classes are 
divided into: (i) listed equity from 
developed markets; (ii) listed equity 
from emerging markets; (iii) fixed 
income from sovereign, 
government and other non-
corporate issuers; (iv) fixed income 
from corporate issuers; (v) private 
equity; (vi) listed real estate or 
property; (vii) non- listed real estate 
or property; (viii) hedge funds; (ix) 
commodities; (x) infrastructure; and 
(xi) cash. 
Level of 
shareholder 
activism 
(question 17 of 
the PRI 
questionnaire) 
Level of shareholder activism 
measured by the adoption of active 
ownership activities performed by the 
investor, external service provider or 
external investment manager, per 
signatory 
Different active ownership activities 
are classified into (i) proxy voting 
on listed companies; (ii) file or co-
file shareholder resolutions on 
listed companies; (iii) engagements 
on ESG issues with investees and 
potential investees; (iv) ownership 
and engagement activities focused 
on ESG issues. The measure is 
reliable as data is directly retrieved 
from the PRI signatories. 
Level of voting 
(question 28 of 
the PRI 
questionnaire) 
Level of shareholder activism 
measured by the level of votes cast 
directly or via third parties, per 
signatory 
Votes cast are measured by ballot 
items or resolutions, meetings 
(AGMs, EGMs, etc) and listed 
assets under management. The 
measure is reliable as data is 
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Indicator Analysis of validity Analysis of reliability 
directly retrieved from the PRI 
signatories. 
Level of 
shareholder 
resolutions 
(question 36 of 
the PRI 
questionnaire) 
Level of shareholder activism 
measured by the number of filed or 
co-filed shareholder resolutions 
related to ESG issues, per signatory 
This measure divides the number 
of shareholder resolutions into 
resolutions as lead filer and as co-
filer, and as voted resolutions and 
withdrawn resolutions. The 
measure is reliable as data is 
directly retrieved from the PRI 
signatories. 
Level of 
shareholder 
engagement 
(question 39 of 
the PRI 
questionnaire) 
Level of shareholder engagement on 
ESG issues, per signatory 
This measure classified 
shareholder engagement into 
extensive, moderate and basic 
engagement. The measure is 
reliable as data is directly retrieved 
from the PRI signatories. 
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Appendix 4  
Project Module Supervisor Contact Sheet 
 
Student details: 
Name: Camila Yamahaki 
Title of Project: Determinants of shareholder activism in emerging markets 
Contact details: C.yamahaki@mdx.ac.uk 
  07899695488 
 
Supervisor details: 
Name: Prof. J. George Frynas 
Room number: W158 
Email: G.frynas@mdx.ac.uk 
 
Meeting Date Issue 
1 20/05/2010 
General discussion about the 
dissertation approach 
2 15/07/2010 Feedback literature review 
3 29/07/2010 
Feedback literature review 
Discussion about methodological 
approach 
4 09/08/2010 
Feedback literature review 
Discussion about methodology 
chapter 
5 08/09/2010 Feedback methodology chapter 
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